Apr. 14, 2006.
01:00 AM
RICHARD GWYN
ttp://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1144965013190&call_pageid=968256290204&col=968350116795
The good news
about Iran's declaration that it has
"successfully mastered nuclear technology"
is that it is, almost certainly, a lie. The
bad news is that even though the claim can
quite easily be exposed as either a lie or,
at best, a wild exaggeration, spokesmen in
Tehran nevertheless made it.
There is in
Iran's behaviour a quality of extremism, of
recklessness, of illogicality — something
close to a suicidal call: "Bomb us"— that
mocks all the policies of diplomacy,
moderation and patience, that are always
being urged on the outside world, most
especially on the U.S., as the best way to
deal with Tehran.
Iran,
of course, has a perfect right to develop a
nuclear power program. Whether it really
needs nuclear power given its huge oil and
gas reserves is questionable but that it no
way diminishes its right to spend money on
nuclear power research.
But there's no
requirement for secrecy in nuclear power
research, and no justification whatever for
lying about what it was doing, especially in
progress toward enriching uranium, a vital
step on the road to making a bomb. This is
what Iran did, to the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
In a deal
offered by Russia, Iran could have had all
the enriched uranium it needed for nuclear
power development, but in a safe,
internationally controlled way. Iran
rejected this offer.
This week,
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
boasted that "uranium with the desired
enrichment for nuclear power" had been
achieved. A day later, a senior Iranian
atomic energy official declared that mass
production of enriched uranium (by 54,000
centrifuges rather than the mere 164
supposedly already operating) would start
soon.
No expert
believes a word of this. Iran does have able
scientists. But its technology and
engineering capabilities are crude. Its oil
industry is exceptionally inefficient. Its
civil airplanes constantly break down.
Nuclear analysts believe it will take Iran
at least five years, and quite possibly 15,
to develop a single, crude bomb.
Anthony
Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington
dismisses the latest claims as "little more
than vacuous political posturing."
The end
objective of all of this may be nothing more
than domestic politics. International
criticism, most especially by the U.S., of
Iran's nuclear program, has inspired an
upsurge of patriotism that has made the
mullah-led regime more popular than it has
been in decades.
The scary
alternative explanation is that Iran's end
objective in being so provocative is to
provoke.
In the current
New
Yorker magazine, investigative
reporter Seymour Hersh claims that
"intensified planning" is underway in
Washington for a major air attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities.
President
George W. Bush has flatly denied this. He
would do this no matter what was actually
going on. In practical fact, contingency
planning has to be underway.
An actual
American air attack would severely delay
Iran's nuclear program.
Iran
would suffer terrible damage. But the U.S.
would also be damaged. Its last shreds of
support in the Arab world would vanish.
Terrorist attacks, as on American troops in
Iraq, would multiply. Iran might be able to
choke off oil shipments from Saudi Arabia
through the Straits of Hormuz or, at the
very least, reduce them sharply. A global
recession would become a real possibility.
Iran's
behaviour is reckless, almost suicidal, much
in the way it sent tens of thousands of its
soldiers to certain deaths in World War
I-type mass attacks during its war with Iraq
in the 1980s.
But not
entirely this time. The Cold War was
governed by the doctrine of MAD — Mutual
Assured Destruction. For each side, the cost
of "victory" was too high. So neither moved
against the other.
Iran
today may be conducting a sort of
pre-nuclear version of MAD.
Which isn't to
say that what's now happening isn't pure
madness. On both sides.
US warns Iran of nuclear consequences
Friday 14 April 2006
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/7F256ED3-5729-4996-85A0-70FE18D8F625.htm
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Rice has said Iran is defying the
"international community"
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The US secretary of state says her country
"would look at the full range of options"
available to the UN Security Council to
respond to Iran's defiance of council
resolutions on its nuclear programme.
Condoleezza Rice told reporters on Thursday
that there will "have to be some
consequence" for Iran's refusal to suspend
uranium enrichment activities, as the
Security Council president demanded in a
statement two weeks ago.
Rice spoke to reporters after a meeting with
Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay.
"There is no doubt that Iran continues to
defy the will of the international community
despite the fact that the international
community very clearly said stop," Rice
said.
One option, she said, is the ability to
compel Iran through provisions under Chapter
7 of the UN Charter. These provisions permit
measures to ensure that the will of the
international system is carried out.
US
intelligence
Earlier on Thursday, several top US
intelligence officials said Iran was years
from obtaining the materials and technology
necessary for a nuclear weapon despite its
announcement this week that it had begun
enriching uranium.
Kenneth Brill, the head of the new National
Counterproliferation Centre, said the
Iranian government had blustered before
about developments that did not readily
materialise.
"We really have to see what's happened in
Iran," Brill said. "There is still a very
significant amount of time that needs to be
worked through by the Iranians to get to
where they want to go."
Defending the quality of intelligence
assessments, Brill said much of what the
intelligence agencies had predicted had been
validated by the IAEA and others.
Tehran
insists its work is only for peaceful,
civilian purposes, but the US and a number
of its allies think it is after a nuclear
arsenal.
Dialogue urged
China
on Friday said dialogue was the key to
resolving the West's nuclear stand-off with
Iran.
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, briefing
reporters on President Hu Jintao's visit to
the United States next week, was asked
whether Iran and North Korea would be
raised.
Yang said all international issues of common
concern would be discussed.
"We hope all parties will adopt a
cool-headed approach," he told a news
conference when asked about Iran. "Dialogue
is better than confrontation. We should work
together toward this end."
Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, said on Thursday that
Iran had told him it would step up efforts
to answer questions on its nuclear plans.
ElBaradei is due to report to the UN
Security Council at the end of April.
The Great Iran Debate
The combination of reaction to news reports
of U.S. plans for military strikes on Iran
and Iran's claim to have mastered uranium
processing brought out the best (and worst)
in the comments section.
"Robert
Rose" likens a Bloomberg
wire story headlined
"Iran Could Make Nuclear Bomb in 16 Days,
U.S. Says" to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin
incident in which an exaggerated North
Vietnamese attack on a U.S. ship prompted
Congress to authorize President Johnson to
expand the Vietnam War.
The headline is misleading. The U.S.
official said that if Iran had 50,000
nuclear centrifuges to process uranium it
could produce a bomb in 16 days. Iran has
less than 200 centrifuges today. It seeks to
have 3,000 by next year. The Bloomberg
article quotes one expert as saying that, if
Iran reaches that goal, it could produce
enough fuel for a nuclear weapon in 271
days.
But to Rose's point, is the U.S. attempting
to exaggerate Iran's capabilities? The U.S.
has maintained all along that Iran is
masking sinister ambitions in their nuclear
efforts and after Iran's latest claims,
Condoleezza Rice called for the U.N. to take
"strong
steps."
What do you make of Rice's handling of
U.S. policy?
"Oscar Mayer" makes an important point when
he writes that "this
constant tension [over Iran] adds at
least $15 a barrel to the price of oil. This
translates to over 200 billion dollars of
our annual trade deficit or about 600
billion dollars since the Iraq invasion. Add
the cost of the Iraq war and we are close to
one trillion dollars that this adventure is
costing us."
The geopolitics of attempting to transform
the political order of the Middle East as
the Bush administration seeks to do not only
has the direct costs of intervention but the
indirect costs associated with the region's
primary exports: oil and natural gas.
"What is swept under the carpet by the US,"
contends
HJ Pfau,
"is the fact that Iran has every right to
nuclear energy. This constant harping about
a nuclear bomb, based on no facts
whatsoever, is an American diversion
designed to isolate a regime they don't
like."
Not quite. Iran, as a signatory to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, does have every
right to nuclear energy for civilian
purposes. But in 2002, IAEA inspectors
discovered a secret parallel program in Iran
that seemed to be aimed at creating weapons,
not energy for civilian purposes. That is
why the IAEA still says it cannot be certain
that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons.
The Bush administration may be "harping
about a nuclear bomb," but the concern is
not "based on no facts whatsoever."
Kris says, "I have no doubt that, barring
mainstream opposition from either the US
military, or the right-wing, Bush can
engineer another rush to war in Iran. While
a certain subset of the US population will
cheer on such an avenging mission of justice
and righteousness, an attack on Iran might
swing the 2006 elections, but will otherwise
be a devastating act of self-sabotage, on
the part of America."
This is the central question raised by the
talk of military strikes on Iran. Would any
U.S. military action be an act of
self-defense or aggression? David Patrick
says, "Perhaps the last chance for a
peaceful solution has already been passed."
Israel
Should Support Regime Change in Iran
By Rabbi Daniel M. Zucker April 14, 2006
http://web.israelinsider.com/views/8259.htm

It is time for Israel's Foreign Ministry to
start thinking "outside the box". What is
meant here is for Israel to take the
offensive in its ideological war with the
Islamic Republic of Iran and seek a regime
change to an anti-fundamentalist government.
If Israel had to create such a group, one
would call the idea "fantasy". However,
there already exists exactly such a group of
Iranians who have a forty year track record
of opposing despotism and a quarter century
history of fighting Islamic fundamentalism
"tooth and nail". That Iranian group is the
Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), also
known as the People's Mojahedin Organization
of Iran (PMOI), and its political alliance,
the National Council of Resistance of Iran
(NCRI) of which the MeK is a constituent
member.
Why should Israel consider supporting such
Iranian resistance organizations? Israel,
(and the rest of the world as well), needs
to realize that not all Iranians are the
same. Indeed, the vast majority of Iranians
(90+%) despise the fundamentalist regime,
which has hijacked the democratic revolution
of 1979 and replaced it with an
Islamofascist regime. The MeK and NCRI are
about as different from President
Ahmadinejad's E'telaf-e Abadgaran-e Iran-e
Eslami (aka Abadgaran = Alliance of Builders
of Islamic Iran) as are ordinary Jews or
Israelis from the Neturei Karta. Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and the Iranian ayatollahs are
like the Neturei Karta; indeed in mid-March
a group of five members of the Neturei Karta
traveled to Iran to meet with the Iranian
president and to support his denial of the
Holocaust and anti-Zionism. Apparently the
fundamentalists have found each other, just
like the old adage: "birds of a feather,
flock together". If the fundamentalists can
find a way to come together, bridging their
religious differences, certainly
anti-fundamentalists should be seeking each
other out for coalitions to oppose the
Islamists.
The US State Department, still covering
itself decades after the Iran-Contra
scandal, allowed itself to be misled by
Iranian disinformation, and in seeking
access to Iranian oil (20% of US oil
imports) has followed an unsuccessful policy
of appeasement of the Islamic Republic. In a
failed effort at a quid pro quo deal with
Iran, the State Department in 1997 placed
the MeK on its Foreign Terrorist
Organization list as a sop to the then new
"moderate" President Khatami, the one who
denied talking with or shaking the hand of
Israel's President Moshe Katzav, when both
attended the late Pope John-Paul's funeral
last year. Israel, despite its role as
middle-man in the Irangate fiasco,
(certainly understandable when Saddam
Hussein of Iraq loomed as a larger problem
than Khomeini), has no need of such
appeasement of the ayatollahs.
On the other hand, Israel could well afford
to find new friends in her less than safe
and friendly neighborhood. Turning her
number one enemy into a friend and ally by
supporting those who seek to create a
successful regime change from a
fundamentalist Islamic theocracy to a
secular democracy, is definitely an act of
enlightened self-interest. Incidentally, it
would also be an act of concern for the
establishment of human rights, the lack
thereof for which Iran has been condemned 52
times in the last twenty-seven years by the
United Nations. Ridding the world of the
number one state sponsor of terrorism might
actually top the admiration Israel earned
when it took out Saddam's Osirak reactor in
1981. It would also earn Israel the eternal
gratitude of the Iranian people for
supporting their 27- year quest for freedom
and justice.
Why the MeK and the NCRI and not some other
dissident Iranian group? The MeK and NCRI
have the best credentials as
anti-fundamentalists. They also have the
longest track record of opposing Khomeinism
and Islamic fundamentalism. But more
important still, despite all the false
information suggesting the contrary, MeK and
NCRI have the support of the majority of the
Iranian people, both inside and outside of
Iran.
Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni and Foreign
Ministry Director General Prosor: There is a
group of Iranians who seek your aid and seek
to be of aid to you. Get to know each other
and realize the common concerns and bonds
you share. For if you fail to help each
other, your common enemy will find it much
easier to cause us all a lot of grief and
damage.
Views expressed by the author do not
necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.
Despite Denials, U.S. Plans for Iran War
The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has been
conducting theater campaign analysis for a
full scale war with Iran since at least May
2003, responding to Pentagon directions to
prepare for potential operations in the
"near term."
The campaign analysis, called TIRANNT, for
"theater Iran near term," posits an
Iraq-like maneuver war between U.S. and
Iranian ground forces and incorporates
lessons learned from Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
In addition to the TIRANNT effort and the
Marine Corps
Karona
invasion scenario
I discussed yesterday, the military has
also completed an analysis of Iran's missile
force (the "BMD-I" study), the Defense
Intelligence Agency has updated "threat
data" for Iranian forces, and Air Force
planners have modeled attacks against "real
world" Iranian air defenses and targets to
establish new metrics. What is more, the
United States and Britain have been
conducting war games and contingency
planning under a Caspian Sea scenario that
could also pave the way for northern
operations against Iran.
After new reports of intensified planning
for Iran began to circulate over the
weekend, the President dismissed the news as
"wild speculation."
On Tuesday, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld similarly called media speculation
about Iran war planning as "fantasyland."
Asked at a Pentagon new conference whether
he had in recent days, weeks or month, asked
the Joint Staff or CENTCOM to "update,
refine, [or] modify the contingencies for
possible military options against Iran,"
Rumsfeld said: "We have I don't know how
many various contingency plans in this
department. And the last thing I'm going to
do is to start telling you or anyone else in
the press or the world at what point we
refresh a plan or don't refresh a plan, and
why. It just isn't useful."
I beg to differ, Mr. Secretary.
World pressure and American diplomacy would
be mightily enhanced if Iran understood that
the United States was indeed so serious
about it acquiring nuclear weapons it was
willing to go to war over it. What is more,
the American public needs to know that this
is a possibility.
Think the U.S. military isn't serious about
war with Iran?
Since at least 2003, in response to a number
of directives from Secretary Rumsfeld and
then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen. Richard Myers, the military services
and Pentagon intelligence agencies have been
newly working on a number of "near term" and
"near-year" Iranian contingency studies in
support of CENTCOM war planning efforts.
These studies, war games, and modeling
efforts have been the first step in shifting
the bulk of planning from almost exclusive
focus on Iraq to Iran. At CENTCOM
headquarters in Tampa, Florida, at Army and
Air Force CENTCOM support headquarters in
Georgia and South Carolina, and at service
analysis and operations research
organizations like the Center for Army
Analysis at Fort Belvoir (thanks readers for
correcting me), a monumental effort has been
underway to "build" an Iran country baseline
for war planning.
Under the TIRANNT campaign analysis program,
Army organizations, together with CENTCOM
headquarters planners, have been examining
both near term and "out year" scenarios for
war with Iran, covering all aspects of a
major combat operation from mobilization and
deployment of forces through post-war
"stability" operations after regime change.
The core TIRANNT effort itself began in May
2003, when modelers and intelligence
specialists pulled together the data sets
needed for theater level (large scale)
scenario analysis in support of updated war
plans. Successive iterations of TIRANTT
efforts have updated "blue," (United
States), "green," (coalition), and "threat"
databases with post-Iraq war information.
The follow-on TIRANNT Campaign Analysis
(TIRANNT-CA), which began in October 2003,
has calculated the results of different
campaign scenarios against Iran to provide
options for "courses of action" analysis.
According to military sources close to the
planning process, in 2002-2003, the CENTCOM
commander, Gen. John Abizaid was directed to
develop a new "strategic concept" for Iran
war planning and potential courses of action
for Secretary of Defense and Presidential
review.
Parallel with the TIRANNT and TIRANNT-CA
analysis, Army and CENTCOM planners have
also been undertaking the "TOY study." TOY
stands for TIRANNT Out-Year, and posits a
U.S.-Iran war in the year 2011. Under the
TOY modeling effort, Army division-sized
formations as currently organized are sent
up against real world models of Iranian
ground units. The results are compared to
the same engagements when fought by newly
reorganized Army brigade combat teams who
fight independent of a strict divisional
hierarchy. The product gauges not only the
impact of military "transformation" efforts
in the Army but also the most propitious
timing for war.
Under a separate "BMD-I study," for
ballistic missile defense - Iran, the Army
Concepts Analysis Agency has modeled the
performance of U.S. and Iranian weapon
systems to determine the number of missiles
expected to "leak through" a coalition
missile defense in the 2005 (current) time
frame. The BMD-I study has not only looked
at U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missile
performance and optimum placement to protect
U.S. and coalition forces, but also the
results of combined air, cyber warfare and
missile defense operations to disable
Iranian command and control capabilities and
missiles on the ground before Iran can fire
them.
In July 2004, U.S. and British Army planners
also met at Fort Belvoir to play the Hotspur
2004 war game, a 2015 timeframe Caspian Sea
scenario examining deployment of forces,
movement to "contact" with the enemy, and
"decisive" operations. A U.K. medium weight
brigade operated subordinate to U.S. forces
and the game included an assessment of
lessons learned in U.S.-British
interoperability during similar operations
in southern Iraq.
The extremely complex Caspian Sea scenario
has become the standard non-Asian platform
for education, training and force
development in the Army. The current 2005
"high resolution" version model provides
analysts with the ability to manipulate
thousands of entities using tens of
thousands of combat orders to simulate all
aspects of major combat operations. The
scenario not only has variable "physical
battlespace" including urban terrain, but an
adaptive enemy, allowing analysis of not
just standard military operations but also
complex counter-insurgency activity.
In
February 2005, after a similar flurry of
news reporting on U.S. military options for
Iran, the Deputy Commander of CENTCOM Lt.
Gen. Lance Smith was asked at a Pentagon
briefing if the Tampa based command was in
any kind of heightened state of planning
when it comes to Iran.
"We plan everything," Smith responded. "We
have a requirement on a regular basis to
update plans. We try to keep them current,
particularly if -- you know, if our region
is active. But I haven't been called into
any late-night meetings at, you know, 8:00
at night, saying, 'Holy cow, we got to sit
down and go plan for Iran.'"
Throughout mid-2002, when a similar public
debate about an Iraq war plan swirled in the
news, Secretary Rumsfeld, Myers, and then
CENTCOM commander Gen. Tommy Franks insisted
that there were no "war plans," that they
hadn't been asked to prepare a war plan,
that no decisions had been made, that no war
plan sat on the President's desk.
It would take a doctoral dissertation to
wade through the chronology of statements
and actions to sort out the specifics of the
truth, but here is the reality: Iraq war
planning consumed the government inner
circle all through this period and the
government made a knee jerk decision --
never really thoughtfully reviewed -- not to
speak about it. "We don't discuss war
plans," the mantra goes. And it is dead
wrong.
Maybe history will show that the Bush
administration was so hell bent on war in
2002-2003, nothing that Saddam Hussein could
have done would have prevented it. Still the
world went through the motions of U.N.
inspections and the Security Council and the
U.S. Congress made decisions based upon the
allusion that war could still be averted,
that all diplomatic options would be
exhausted before the decision to go to war
was made.
We now also know that the Iraqis themselves
didn't quite believe that the United States
was serious about regime change and that it
would go all the way. Perhaps though, had
the United States candidly stated its
intentions rather than spending so much time
denying reality, Baghdad would have gotten
the message and war would have been averted,
perhaps in another time and place.
It seems today we face a similar problem
with Iran. The President of the United
States insists that all options are on the
table while the Secretary of Defense insists
it "isn't useful" to discuss American
options.
I think this sends the wrong message to
Tehran. Contingency planning for a full
fledged war with Iran may seem incredible
right now, and Iran isn't Iraq. But Iran
needs to understand that the United States
isn't hamstrung by a lack of options, Iran
needs to know that it can't just stonewall
and evade international inspections, that it
can't burrow further underground in hopes of
"winning" because war is messy.
As I've said before in these pages, I don't
believe that the United States is planning
to imminently attack Iran, and I
specifically don't think so because Iran
doesn't have nuclear weapons and it hasn't
lashed out militarily against anyone.
But the United States military is really,
really getting ready, building war plans and
options, studying maps, shifting its
thinking.
It is not in our interests to have Tehran
not understand this. The military options
currently on the table might not be good
ones, but Iran shouldn't make decisions
based upon a false view. Two so-called
"experts" are quoted in
The Washington Post
today saying that there are no options,
that there is no Plan B, that the United
States will just live with Iran acquiring
nuclear weapons. They are fundamentally
wrong about the options, and misunderstand
the Bush administration as well.
But most important, this constant drum beat
in the newspapers and the media sends the
wrong message to Iran. This is why Secretary
Rumsfeld should be saying that the U.S. is
preparing war plans for Iran, and that the
United States views the situation so
seriously that it would be willing to risk
war if Iran acquired nuclear weapons or
lashed out against the U.S. or its friends.
The war planning moreover, Rumsfeld needs to
add, is not just routine, it is not just
what military's do all the time. It is
specifically related to Iran, to its illegal
pursuit of nuclear weapons, to its meddling
in Iraq and support for international
terrorism.
Iran
needs to know the facts and the American
public need to know the facts. But most
important, the American public needs to hear
the facts about American war plans, military
options and preparedness from the government
so that they can understand where we are and
decide whether they think the threat from
Iran justifies the risks of another war.
Iran
rebuffs UN nuclear chief in talks
President asserts right to continue uranium
process
By Ali Akbar Dareini, Associated Press |
April 14, 2006
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/04/14/iran_rebuffs_un_nuclear_chief_in_talks/
TEHRAN -- Iran
rebuffed a request by the UN nuclear agency
chief yesterday that it suspend uranium
enrichment, and President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad insisted his country will not
retreat ''one iota."
The chief,
Mohamed ElBaradei, looked much less
optimistic after the four hours of talks
with Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali
Larijani, than he had when he arrived for
the one-day visit and said the time was
''ripe" for a political solution to the
standoff.
ElBaradei, who
is hoping to prevent a confrontation between
Tehran and the Security Council, put forward
the UN request for Iran to suspend
enrichment until questions over its nuclear
program are resolved.
But Larijani
indicated suspension was not an option.
''Such proposals are not very important
ones," he told reporters matter-of-factly
while standing next to ElBaradei at a joint
news conference after the talks.
Hours earlier,
Ahmadinejad said enrichment was a line in
the sand from which the Iranians would not
retreat. ''We won't hold talks with anyone
about the right of the Iranian nation (to
enrich uranium), and no one has the right to
retreat, even one iota," the president was
quoted as saying by Islamic Republic News
Agency.
''Our answer
to those who are angry about Iran achieving
the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one
phrase. We say: 'Be angry at us and die of
this anger,' " Ahmadinejad said.
Iran
says its nuclear work is solely for
peaceful, civilian purposes, but the United
States and several allies believe it seeks a
nuclear arsenal.
ElBaradei said
the extent of the nuclear program was
uncertain: ''We have not seen diversion of
nuclear material for weapons purposes, but
the picture is still hazy."
During the 20
years of Iran's nuclear program, ''lots of
activities went unreported," ElBaradei said.
Higher-level
enrichment makes uranium suitable for a
nuclear bomb, although Western experts
familiar with Iran's program say the country
is far from producing weapons-grade uranium.
ElBaradei said
that in their talks, Larijani had renewed
Iran's commitment ''to provide clarity to
outstanding issues before I write my report
to the (International Atomic Energy Agency)
board by the end of this month."
The Security
Council has given Iran until April 28 to
cease enrichment of uranium. But Iran has
rejected the demand. It said Tuesday that,
for the first time, it had enriched uranium
with 164 centrifuges -- a step toward
large-scale production.
Representatives of the five permanent
Security Council members -- the United
States, Britain, France, China, and Russia
-- discussed the latest development
yesterday morning. The United States and
Europe are pressing for sanctions, a step
Russia and China have so far opposed.
''We want to
see what the outcome of the discussions
between ElBaradei and the Iranian government
is. And when we get information on that,
we'll consider what to do next," US
Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton
said after the meeting.
Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice said there will
''have to be some consequence" for Iran's
refusal to suspend uranium enrichment
activities.
''There is no
doubt that Iran continues to defy the will
of the international community despite the
fact that the international community very
clearly said stop," Rice said.
Undersecretary
for Arms Control Robert Joseph rejected
Iran's claims that its nuclear program was
for peaceful purposes.
''If it had
nuclear weapons, I am sure (Iran) would be
even more ambitious in its use of terror to
undercut the prospects of peace in the
Middle East," Joseph told reporters in
Cairo.
China
said yesterday it was sending its assistant
foreign minister to Tehran to convey its
concerns about the nuclear program.
Russia
to Host New Round of Talks on Iran
The Associated
Press
Friday, April 14, 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041400202.html
MOSCOW
-- Russia will host another round of talks
next week with the United States, the
European Union and China on Iran's nuclear
program, the Foreign Ministry said Friday.
The talks will
be held in Moscow on Tuesday, said Foreign
Ministry spokesman Andrei Krivtsov.
China
said Thursday that Cui Tiankai, assistant to
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, would
visit Iran and Russia on April 14-18. Russia
and China, which have strong economic ties
with Iran, have opposed the U.S. push for
international sanctions against Iran over
its nuclear program.
U.S.
Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns will
also be in Moscow on Monday for a meeting of
political directors of the Group of Eight,
the U.S. Embassy said.
Mohamed
ElBaradei, the chief of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, visited Tehran on
Thursday and pushed Iranian officials to
suspend uranium enrichment until questions
over Tehran's nuclear program have been
resolved. But Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad said Iran will not retreat "one
iota" on its uranium enrichment.
Iran
insists on its right to enrich uranium as
part of a civilian power generation program,
but the United States and others accuse
Tehran of covertly pursuing a nuclear
weapons bid and demand a halt to all
enrichment activities.
Iran
Rafsanjani meets radical Palestinian leaders
http://www.iranmania.com/News/ArticleView/Default.asp?NewsCode=41994&NewsKind=Current%20Affairs
LONDON,
April 14 (IranMania) - Iran's influential
former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
met with leaders of the radical Palestinian
groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as
the head of the Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah
movement, Iranian sources said, according to
AFP.
Rafsanjani is
on a four-day visit to the Syrian capital
amid worldwide alarm over Iran's
announcement Tuesday that it had
successfully enriched uranium, a process
that can lead to the production of fuel for
nuclear power plants or the fissile core of
an atomic bomb.
"The
Palestinian resistance has today reached a
new phase which requires the support of all
Muslim countries... to reach victory,"
Rafsanjani said, according to an Iranian
source who spoke on condition of anonymity.
Rafsanjani met
Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah late
Wednesday at the Iranian embassy in
Damascus, the source said.
Nasrallah said
that Iran's ability to enrich uranium would
"be a large moral boost to the resistance."
An Iranian
diplomatic source also said that on
Wednesday night Rafsanjani met Hamas's
political supremo Khaled Meshaal and Islamic
Jihad's secretary-general Ramadan Shaleh,
AFP noted.
"The Muslim
world is proud that Tehran has acquired
nuclear technology," Meshaal reportedly said
during their meeting.
"Uranium
enrichment provides a great deal of moral
support to the Palestinian people and heroes
of the resistance," he said.
Rafsanjani
assured that Iran would continue its support
for the Palestinian resistance and
criticized "Western states that have
suspended aid the Palestinian Authority."
Rafsanjani
also met with Syrian Prime Minister Naji
Otri and Foreign Minister Walid Muallem over
"external pressures confronting Syria and
Iran," the official SANA news agency said.
On Wednesday,
Rafsanjani vowed Tehran would not give in to
UN pressures to halt its enrichment of
uranium, which he hailed as a great
achievement.
Tehran's
announcement put Iran on a collision course
with the UN Security Council, which has
given the country until April 28 to accede
to demands that it halt enrichment or face
possible sanctions.
Iran
insists that its nuclear program is aimed
purely at producing nuclear power, but the
country is widely suspected of using it to
conceal efforts to develop atomic weapons.
Asked about
international pressures on Syria over issues
ranging from its alleged interference in
neighboring Lebanon to alleged support for
Iraqi rebels, Rafsanjani said Wednesday:
"Iran and Syria are in the same boat."
Rafsanjani,
who heads Iran's powerful Expediency
Council, is slated to hold talks with
President Bashar al-Assad at some point
during his visit.
On Friday,
Rafsanjani is to visit the tomb in Qarhaba
of the president's father and predecessor in
office, Hafez al-Assad. The following day,
he is set to visit Shiite Muslim holy sites
in Damascus before heading home.
Will America avoid a war with Iran?
13/04/2006 15:25
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20060413/46040998.html
MOSCOW.
(RIA Novosti political commentator Poytr
Goncharov.) - Tehran has announced that it
will assemble 3,000 uranium enrichment
centrifuges by the end of the Iranian year,
which is March 21, 2007.
This is not the first exchange of
"pre-emptive strikes" between Washington and
Tehran, which fuels the thought that a war
between them is unavoidable. Washington
responded to the large-scale naval exercises
in the Persian Gulf, which demonstrated
Iran's readiness to protect its nuclear
program from a potential aggression, with an
article by Seymour Hersh, a regular
contributor to The New Yorker on military
and security matters.
Revelations by that journalist, who is known
to have connections in the U.S.
Administration, about a potential air attack
at about 400 targets in Iran are most
probably based on insider information. But
they did not embarrass Tehran, even though
Hersh writes about possible use of tactical
nuclear weapons. Analysts mentioned the same
number of targets when writing that Iran
might attack 400 targets in Israel if the
U.S. drives it into a corner.
The possible use of tactical weapons should
not have come as a surprise to Tehran
either, because the National Security
Strategy made public by Washington on March
16 reaffirmed its intention to use such
weapons in preventive strikes.
Tehran
responded to Hersh's article by saying that
Iranian scientists had enriched uranium to
3.5% and 3,000 enrichment centrifuges would
be assembled soon.
"Iran will soon join the international club
of states that have nuclear technology,"
President Ahmadinejad has said. The U.S.
Administration blanched at this statement as
one more example of the Iranian regime's
neglect for the international community.
How long will the sides keep exchanging
these "pinpoint strikes" and what will be
the end? The U.S.-initiated escalation of
tensions over Iran's nuclear program is
gathering momentum. In early March, the
United States rejected the idea of a meeting
of the European Trio and China to draft a
new strategy on the Iranian nuclear problem.
In one of his interviews, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns
mentioned the creation of an anti-Iranian
coalition. The new National Security
Strategy labeled Iran the main enemy of the
U.S. And in mid-March, the U.S. started
amassing troops on the border with Iran and
announced - but has not started - Operation
Swarmer aimed at clearing "a suspected
[Iraqi] insurgent operating area."
Meanwhile, Iran refused to comply with the
request of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
regarding the additional protocol to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would allow
the IAEA to make surprise inspections of its
nuclear facilities. Tehran also does not
agree to stop its uranium enrichment
projects. It looks as if it wants to fuel
tensions over the nuclear dossier no less
than Washington; its latest statement on
uranium enrichment has forced the problem
into a dead-end.
Tehran
probably thinks that the U.S. would never
start a military operation against it,
because it is bogged down in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and American public opinion
will be categorically against starting one
more war. Israel is not likely to
participate in a military operation against
Iran either, especially in view of growing
tensions in the Palestinian territories. And
lastly, experts say that Iran is much
stronger than Iraq, and Washington should
take this into account.
All, or nearly all, of this is true. But the
U.S. is not doing as badly in Afghanistan as
in Iraq, and hence the possibility of
another military operation waged
simultaneously with actions in Afghanistan
cannot be ruled out. And Washington
certainly knows that Iran is not Iraq, which
is why the potential Iranian operation will
not be a carbon copy of the Iraqi war.
As to Israel and the Palestinian problem,
the United States will hardly look benignly
at Iran's intention to acquire the status of
the regional superpower, which Tehran has
recently proclaimed as its goal. Washington
regards Iran's uncompromising stand on the
creation of a full nuclear cycle as a wish
to create the bomb, though Iran claims that
it is creating the infrastructure for a
peaceful nuclear program.
According to Washington, there are more than
enough reasons to doubt Iran's sincerity.
Indeed, why should Iran need a full nuclear
cycle if producing nuclear fuel is nearly
four times more expensive than buying it?
Will the U.S. decide against a military
operation to suit Iran's ambitions?
Difficult to say, because it is America's
interests in the region that are at stake.
UN Security Council's sanctions against Iran
are another factor. Israel, which is
America's strategic ally in the region,
suggested imposing increasingly harsh
sanctions on Iran. Therefore, Washington
probably regards a military operation
against Iran as the last resort to be taken
if the UN does not approve sanctions. In
short, nobody can say now if the U.S. will
avoid a war with Iran.
Target: Iran
Yes, there
is a feasible military option against the
mullahs' nuclear program.
by Thomas
McInerney
04/24/2006, Volume 011, Issue 30
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/101dorxa.asp
A MILITARY OPTION AGAINST Iran's nuclear
facilities is feasible. A diplomatic
solution to the nuclear crisis is
preferable, but without a credible military
option and the will to implement it,
diplomacy will not succeed. The announcement
of uranium enrichment last week by President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shows Iran will not bow
easily to diplomatic pressure. The existence
of a military option may be the only means
of persuading Iran--the world's leading
sponsor of terrorism--to back down from
producing nuclear weapons.
A military option would be all the more
credible if backed by a new coalition of the
willing and if coupled with intense
diplomacy during a specific time frame. The
coalition could include Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey,
Britain, France, and Germany. Solidarity is
important and would surely contribute to
potential diplomatic success. But should
others decline the invitation, the United
States must be prepared to act.
What would an effective military response
look like? It would consist of a powerful
air campaign led by 60 stealth aircraft
(B-2s, F-117s, F-22s) and more than 400
nonstealth strike aircraft, including B-52s,
B-1s, F-15s, F-16s, Tornados, and F-18s.
Roughly 150 refueling tankers and other
support aircraft would be deployed, along
with 100 unmanned aerial vehicles for
intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, and 500 cruise missiles. In
other words, overwhelming force would be
used.
The objective would be, first and foremost,
to destroy or severely damage Iran's nuclear
development and production facilities and
put them out of commission for at least five
years. Another aim would
be to destroy the Iranian air defense
system, significantly damage its air force,
naval forces, and Shahab-3 offensive missile
forces. This would prevent Iran from
projecting force outside the country and
retaliating militarily. The air campaign
would also wipe out or neutralize Iran's
command and control capabilities.
This coalition air campaign would hit more
than 1,500 aim points. Among the weapons
would be the new 28,000-pound bunker
busters, 5,000-pound bunker penetrators,
2,000-pound bunker busters, 1,000-pound
general purpose bombs, and 500-pound GP
bombs. A B-2 bomber, to give one example,
can drop 80 of these 500-pound bombs
independently targeted at 80 different aim
points.
This force would give the coalition an
enormous destructive capability, since all
the bombs in the campaign feature precision
guidance, ranging from Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (the so-called JDAMS) to
laser-guided, electro-optical, or
electronically guided High Speed
Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) for
suppression of Iranian surface-to-air
missiles. This array of precision weapons
and support aircraft would allow the initial
attacks to be completed in 36 to 48 hours.
The destruction of Iran's military force
structure would create the opportunity for
regime change as well, since it would
eliminate some or all of Ahmadinejad's and
the mullahs' ability to control the
population. Simultaneously or prior to the
attack, a major covert operation could be
launched, utilizing Iranian exiles and
dissident forces trained during the period
of diplomacy. This effort would be based on
the Afghan model that led to the fall of the
Taliban in 2001. Not only would the overt
and covert attacks weaken the ability of
Iran's leaders to carry out offensive
operations in retaliation, they would
cripple the leaders' power to control their
own people.
Iran's
diverse population should be fertile ground
for a covert operation. Iran is only 51
percent Persian. Azerbaijanis and Kurds
comprise nearly 35 percent of the
population. Seventy percent are under 30,
and the jobless rate hovers near 20 percent.
Iran's
leaders have threatened to unleash a
firestorm of terrorism in the event military
action is taken against them. Any country
involved in the attack would be subject to
retaliation by Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic
Jihad, and al Qaeda, the Iranians have
claimed. If nothing else, this threat
demonstrates how closely tied Iran is to
terrorist groups. The United States and its
allies would have to be prepared for
stepped-up terrorist acts. Iran could also
project forces into Iraq, but this is
unlikely because they would encounter the
full strength of the American military.
However, Iran might encourage proxies among
Iraq's militant Shiites. Coalition forces in
Iraq would have to be ready to respond.
No doubt the Iranians would attempt to close
the Gulf of Hormuz and block the extensive
shipping that goes through it. American air
and naval forces are quite capable of
keeping the gulf open, though shipping might
be slowed. The most adverse economic
consequences of shipping delays would be
felt in Iran itself.
President Bush is right when he says Iran
cannot be permitted to have nuclear weapons.
The prospect of leaders like Ahmadinejad,
who advocates wiping Israel "off the map,"
with their hands on nuclear weapons is a
risk we cannot take. Diplomacy must be
pursued vigorously, but the experience with
Iraq
suggests there's little reason for optimism.
Thus, a viable military option is
imperative.
Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney (Ret.) served as
assistant vice chief of staff of the United
States Air Force.
'Big George': The Coming Attack on Iran
Kenneth R. Timmerman, NewsMax.com
Friday, April 14, 2006
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/4/13/94944.shtml?s=sp
WASHINGTON
-- Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Tom McInerney
calls it the "Big George" scenario.
According to
the man who helped plan the first air war
against Saddam in 1991, U.S. aircraft, armed
with conventional bunker-buster bombs, would
be more than enough to wipe out Iran's
nuclear and missile facilities, and cripple
its ability to command and control its
military forces.
McInerney
believes that U.S. air power is so massive,
precise, and stealthy, it can effectively
disarm Iran with just limited assistance
from covert operators on the ground whose
task would be to light up enemy targets.
In his "Big
George" scenario, the United States would
attack 1,000 targets in Iran. Fifteen B2
stealth bombers based in the United States
and another 45 F117s and F-22s based in the
region would carry out the initial waves of
the attack, crippling Iran's long-range
radar and strategic air defenses.
Massive,
additional waves of carrier-based F-18s, as
well as F-15s and F-16s launching from
ground bases in Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the
United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, and
Bahrain, would take out Iran's known nuclear
and missile sites.
"Big George"
would also target command and control
facilities – Revolutionary Guards command
centers, key clerics, and other
regime-sensitive sites – in the hope of
triggering a revolt against the clerical
regime by opposition groups inside Iran.
The massive
strike scenario could be carried out in just
two days, McInerney told an audience of
intelligence specialists recently in
Washington. "We must destroy and damage
Iran's nuclear capability for at least five
years," McInerney said.
If the
president decided to focus solely on Iran's
nuclear and missile sites, McInerney
proposed a Plan B version he called "Big
Rummy."
"Big Rummy"
would be executed in a single night, and
would concentrate on 500 "aim points." It
would require greater assistance from covert
operators if the administration's goal was
to provoke regime collapse, McInerney added.
But in a report appearing in the New Yorker,
left-wing columnist Seymour Hersh claims
that President Bush is so filled with doubt
over the Pentagon's conventional
capabilities that he asked military planners
to consider using nuclear weapons against
Iran.
Hersh claimed
that his sources in the defense and
intelligence establishment suggested the
military could use the B61-11 warhead. But
Hersh's scenario, based on old technology,
packs more political shock value than actual
military punch.
The first B61
warhead, now designated B61-1, entered the
U.S. strategic stockpile in 1968, according
to the Department of Energy.
A reconfigured
B61, designated B61-7, was the first U.S.
strategic nuclear weapon to be equipped with
a "hardened ground-penetrator nose." It was
introduced into the stockpile in 1985 and
had a selectable yield of 10 to about 340
kilotons, according to a report by the
anti-nuclear Los Alamos Study Group. The
report can be viewed at
www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/lasg.htm.
The 1990s
upgrade, B61-11, can be "dialed down" to
even smaller nuclear yields, reportedly to
just 0.3 kilotons.
All the B61
family of warheads are gravity bombs using
delayed fuzes to allow the attacking
aircraft to escape. But it remains unclear
how successful such weapons would be at
reaching hardened nuclear sites buried deep
inside mountains, where some of Iran's
clandestine facilities are believed to be.
U.S.
military planners have long wanted to
develop a new generation of low yield,
nuclear earth penetrators, to hit hardened
nuclear sites. In their arguments to
Congress in favor of such weapons, they have
cited the necessity of eliminating
facilities buried deep in the mountains of
North Korea.
However, arms
control advocates have argued successfully
that such weapons would constitute an
unwarranted threat to non-nuclear countries.
Last year the United States Senate refused
yet again to authorize funds to develop a
new generation of nuclear bunker buster
bombs by one vote.
The alleged
White House request to include nuclear
weapons in strike plans against Iran upset
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hersh
writes.
Citing a
former senior intelligence officer, Hersh
claims that top commanders "have talked
about resigning," because their efforts to
remove the nuclear option from the evolving
war plans for Iran have fallen on deaf ears.
Hersh has
frequently quoted former DIA analyst Colonel
Patrick Laing and like-minded former
officials who have vigorously denounced the
Bush administration over the war in Iraq.
Their claims
have been dismissed by current military and
intelligence officials who argue that they
are politically motivated.
In one such
story in 2003, Hersh alleged the Pentagon
had a "secret" Iraq war planning outfit that
was carrying out rogue intelligence
operations, when in fact the Office of
Special Plans was an analytical unit that
was part of the Pentagon's policy shop.
Former
President George H.W. Bush ordered the U.S.
military to repatriate all remaining U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons stationed overseas
in 1991.
The deployment
of tactical nuclear weapons overseas would
require the approval of host governments,
thus increasing the likelihood that news of
the deployment would leak.
The only
country that has threatened to use nuclear
weapons against a terrorist state is France.
On Jan. 19,
French President Jacques Chirac announced
publicly that he had ordered the French
military to utilize French nuclear weapons
to hit targets in countries that threaten to
use weapons of mass destruction in a
terrorist attack.
His speech was
widely interpreted in France to mean that
the weapons had been retargeted against
Iran.
Iran's
Response
For its part,
Iran is unlikely to sit still should the
United States or its NATO allies make active
preparations for a military strike on
Iranian nuclear facilities.
Iran
tested its war plans last week, mobilizing
tens of thousands of troops, and hundreds of
small boats, missile boats, aircraft and new
missiles in the Persian Gulf.
Revolutionary
Guards Air Force Cmdr. General Hossein
Salami reconfirmed in an April 4 Iranian TV
interview
(www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1106)
that Iran had the capability to block the
Strait of Hormuz, where 20 percent of the
world's oil supplies transit daily. [Editor's
Note: NewsMax first revealed
Iran's first-strike plans in February, after
obtaining copies of the classified war plans
from a former Iranian intelligence officer:
Iran Readies Plan to Close Strait of Hormuz]
"Iran controls
over 2,000 km of the Persian Gulf and the
Gulf of Oman. Even without this [latest]
maneuver Iran has this ability. This is a
natural ability of our country. Iran can
block oil export whenever necessary," he
said.
Iran
also announced that it had tested a series
of new missiles, including a Shahab-3
variant with multiple warheads. The United
States believes Iran redesigned the Shahab-3
in 2004 to carry a nuclear warhead. The
missile has sufficient range to reach
Israel.
A further
redesign to carry multiple warheads could
only mean one thing, former White House
counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke, told
ABC News: "Iran is claiming that missile has
multiple warheads," he said. "The only
reason for having multiple warheads is if
you have nuclear weapons."
NewsMax first
revealed Iran's first-strike plans in
February, after obtaining copies of the
classified war plans from a former Iranian
intelligence officer.
The plans
instructed Iranian forces to use chemical,
biological, and radiological weapons to
repulse a U.S.-led ground offensive in the
Strait of Hormuz.
They also
called on Iran's Revolutionary Guards Navy
to launch hundreds of explosives-laden
speedboats in swarming suicide attacks
against U.S. warships.
Iran
will use Chinese and Russian-made
bottom-tethered mines to block the Strait of
Hormuz, and to bottle up U.S. and foreign
warships already present inside the Persian
Gulf.
The EM-53
bottom-tethered mines Iran purchased from
China in the 1990s uses a rocket-propelled
charge that can hit the hull of its target
at speeds in excess of 70 miles per hour.
Some analysts believe it can knock out a
U.S. aircraft carrier.
United Against Iran
The United
States currently has a carrier battle group
in the Persian Gulf, led by the USS Ronald
Reagan (CVN 76).
The battle
group includes Aegis-class cruisers and
destroyers capable of launching cruise
missiles, anti-submarine and anti-mine
warfare vessels, nuclear submarines, and
some 70 attack and support aircraft.
And the United
States is not alone in handling maritime
security operations in the Persian Gulf.
More than a half-dozen other nations
participating in three international task
forces are helping to keep tabs on the area
and on Iran.
Combined Task
Force 58 patrols the northern Persian Gulf
area near Basra, Iraq, with the specific
mission of protecting Iraqi oil export
terminals, according to U.S. Navy Web sites.
It is made up of forces from Australia, the
United Kingdom, the United States and Iraq,
and is led by a Royal Navy officer.
Combined Task
Force 152 is an exclusively American force,
and patrols the central and southern Persian
Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz. The
U.S. Fifth Fleet, which contributes forces
to Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq, is
headquartered in Bahrain.
Combined Task
Force 150 is based outside the Gulf and
patrols the Gulf of Oman, the North Arabian
Sea, parts of the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of
Aden and the Red Sea. It includes ships from
France, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy,
as well as Pakistan.
Altogether,
the three international task forces include
on average 45 ships and 20,000 personnel
from various nations, according to the U.S.
Navy.
Of course, all
of this news doesn't bode well for oil
prices. Reacting to escalating tensions in
the Persian Gulf, oil was trading for May
delivery on the New York Mercantile Exchange
at just under $69 per barrel yesterday.
Nuclear Hostage Crisis
April 14, 2006
The Wall Street Journal
Michael Rubin
link to original article
On April 11, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad announced, "Iran has joined the
club of nuclear countries." State television
broadcast the audience chanting "God is
great." The presence of senior military
commanders underlined the nature of the
program, which the regime vowed to continue.
Mohammad Saeedi, deputy chairman of Iran's
Atomic Energy Organization, told state-run
television that the Islamic Republic would
begin uranium enrichment on an industrial
scale but Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen.
Hassan Firouzabadi suggested a new status
quo. "The West can do nothing and is obliged
to extend to us the hand of friendship," he
said.
Some diplomats are inclined to take the
bait. Kofi Annan urged "everyone to work
more actively in search of a diplomatic
solution." Earlier this month, German
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
urged the U.S. to engage Iran directly. On
April 11, Council on Foreign Relations
President Richard Haass said that if he were
still the State Department's policy planning
director, a position he held between 2001
and 2003, he "would put together a
diplomatic package." International Atomic
Energy Agency director-general Mohamed
ElBaradei continues to push the idea. The
idea of a Grand Bargain -- diplomatic
recognition, security guarantees, and
economic incentives in exchange for Iranian
forfeiture of its nuclear autonomy -- has
had long resonance in the foreign policy
debate, even though a similar strategy
failed to halt North Korea's program.
Proposals for direct negotiations may be
attractive, but they ignore Iranian history.
Implicit in any deal is recognition of a
system of government which, according to
recent surveys, enjoys at most 20% popular
support. The Islamic Republic's greatest
fear is demography; 70% of Iranians came of
age after the Islamic Revolution. They are
proud and nationalistic, yet outward
looking. They represent Iran's future and
have no love for their leadership. The White
House should not squander their goodwill. In
1953 and 1979, Washington supported an
unpopular regime against the will of the
Iranian people; any deal which would
preserve the regime would be to make the
same mistake again.
When it comes to the Islamic Republic,
diplomatic outreach aggravates rather than
ameliorates tension. Some realists argue
that Washington should appeal to Iranian
pragmatists. A 2004 Council on Foreign
Relations task force labeled Expediency
Council chairman and former President Ali
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani one such
pragmatist, but he is the father of the
Islamic Republic's covert nuclear program;
his pragmatism extends only to questions of
personal -- not uranium -- enrichment.
Factionalism matters. But history suggests
that rather than provide space for
diplomacy, Iran's factional struggles
aggravate it. However well-meaning, Western
outreach empowers hard-liners and undercuts
U.S. interests.
On April 1, 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini
declared the Islamic Republic, mutual
antipathy was not assured. On Nov. 1, 1979,
U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Iran's Prime Minister Mehdi
Bazargan met in Algiers to discuss
resumption of relations. In order to scuttle
rapprochement and embarrass moderates,
hard-line students seized the U.S. embassy
in Tehran, holding 52 Americans hostage for
444 days. Khomeini used the subsequent
crisis to consolidate hard-liner control.
Seven years later, a misguided U.S. attempt
to engage Iran sparked the worst Washington
scandal since Watergate. In March 1986, U.S.
National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane
traveled secretly to Tehran to spearhead
rapprochement as part of a scheme to divert
proceeds from arms sales to the Nicaraguan
resistance. Within days, pamphlets appeared
on Tehran University bulletin boards
condemning "the visit of an American
official." On Nov. 3, 1986, Ash Shiraa, a
pro-Syrian Lebanese magazine, detailed the
secret contacts. While the scandal paralyzed
Ronald Reagan's second term, the leaks
originated not in Washington but in Tehran.
The betrayal of Reagan's confidence had
nothing to do with the U.S., but rather with
an internal Iranian power struggle.
The Clinton administration took its own
misstep toward reconciliation when, on Sept.
15, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright arranged to meet alone with her
Iranian counterpart on the sidelines of a
U.N. Afghanistan conference. Iranian Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi stood her up.
Slights also matter. What Washington
shrugged off as a minor embarrassment
projected U.S. weakness to the Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei's inner circle.
Nor has engagement only backfired with
Washington. Berlin spearheaded engagement
with Tehran in 1992, but suspended it five
years later after a German court found top
Iranian officials, including Messrs.
Khamenei and Rafsanjani, complicit in
ordering the murder of dissidents in Berlin.
But Brussels renewed engagement with vigor
two years later after Iranian President
Muhammad Khatami called for a "Dialogue of
Civilizations." Between 2000 and 2005,
European Union trade with Iran almost
tripled. The regime invested the hard
currency not in civil society but in its
weapons program. Speaking softly while
wielding a big carrot backfires.
It is comforting but dangerous and naive to
believe a magic formula of incentives and
guarantees can defuse the Iranian nuclear
crisis. The cost of diplomacy alone is high.
The Islamic Republic did not construct its
centrifuge cascade overnight. Mr.
Ahmadinejad may want glory, but the credit
for Iran's nuclear enrichment lies with his
reformist and pragmatist predecessors. That
Iran is now enriching uranium is a testament
to years of diplomatic insincerity.
There is little to negotiate. Either Iran
agrees to open its sites -- both declared
and undeclared -- to unfettered inspection,
or it does not. Either Tehran details its
dealings with Pakistani nuclear scientist
Abdul Qadeer Khan, or it does not. While the
National Intelligence Estimate says Iran is
five to 10 years away from building a bomb,
this assumption rests on an entirely
domestic program. If Iran purchases
weapons-grade material from outside
suppliers, all bets are off. North Korea,
partner in Washington's last Grand Bargain,
would be happy to sell.
The cost of any military strike on Iran
would be high, although not as high as the
cost of the Islamic Republic gaining nuclear
weapons. The Bush administration is paying
the price for more than five years without a
cogent, coordinated Iran policy. Each
passing day limits policy options. Engaging
the regime will preserve the problem, not
eliminate it. Only when the regime is
accountable to the Iranian people can there
be a peaceful solution. To do this requires
targeted sanctions -- freezing assets and
travel bans -- on regimes officials, coupled
with augmented and expedited investment in
independent rather than government-licensed
civil society, labor unions and media. It
may be too late, but it would be
irresponsible not to try.
Mr. Rubin, a scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute, is co-author, with
Patrick Clawson, of "Eternal Iran:
Continuity and Chaos" (Palgrave, 2005).
Iran
Rejects U.N. Request to Halt Its Nuclear
Activity
April 14, 2006
The Associated Press
The Los Angeles Times
link to original article
TEHRAN
-- Iran rebuffed a request from U.N. nuclear
agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei on Thursday
that it suspend uranium enrichment, and
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad insisted that
his country would not retreat "one iota."
ElBaradei looked much less optimistic after
four hours of talks with Iran's top nuclear
negotiator, Ali Larijani, than he had when
he arrived for the one-day visit.
ElBaradei, who is hoping to head off a
confrontation between Tehran and the
Security Council, put forward the U.N.
request for Iran to suspend enrichment until
questions over its nuclear program are
resolved.
But Larijani indicated that suspension was
not an option. "Such proposals are not very
important ones," he told reporters while
standing next to ElBaradei at a joint news
conference after the talks.
Hours earlier, Ahmadinejad said Iranians
would not retreat from enrichment.
"We won't hold talks with anyone about the
right of the Iranian nation [to enrich
uranium], and no one has the right to
retreat, even one iota," Ahmadinejad was
quoted as saying by the official Islamic
Republic News Agency.
"Our answer to those who are angry about
Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle
is just one phrase. We say: 'Be angry at us
and die of this anger,' " Ahmadinejad said.
Iran says its nuclear work is solely for
peaceful, civilian purposes, but the U.S.
and a number of its allies believe that
Tehran wants a nuclear arsenal.
ElBaradei said the extent of Iran's nuclear
program was uncertain. "We have not seen
diversion of nuclear material for weapons
purposes, but the picture is still hazy and
not very clear," he said.
During the 20 years of Iran's nuclear
program, "lots of activities went
unreported," ElBaradei said.
Higher-level enrichment makes uranium
suitable for a nuclear bomb, although
Western experts familiar with Iran's program
say the country is far from producing
weapons-grade uranium.
ElBaradei said that in their talks, Larijani
had renewed Iran's commitment "to provide
clarity to outstanding issues before I write
my report" to the International Atomic
Energy Agency board.
The Security Council has given Iran until
April 28 to cease enrichment of uranium. But
Iran has rejected the demand and announced
Tuesday that, for the first time, it had
enriched uranium with 164 centrifuges — a
step toward large-scale production.
Representatives of the five permanent
Security Council members — the U.S.,
Britain, France, China and Russia —
discussed the latest development Thursday
morning. The U.S. and Europe are pressing
for sanctions, a step that Russia and China
have so far opposed.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
said there would "have to be some
consequence" for Iran's refusal to suspend
uranium enrichment activities.
Heard the One About the President?
April 14, 2006
The Guardian
Robert Tait in Tehran
link to original article
The misdirected email or text message is a
hazard of our age. It can sour relationships
and upset the closest of our friends. But
now a stray electronic missive has been
blamed for a spate of arrests, a national
scandal and a very grumpy president of Iran.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic nation's
firebrand leader, has taken umbrage at an
unwelcome text received on his mobile phone.
According to whispered accounts in the
Iranian capital, his ire was stirred when
someone sent him a joke suggesting he didn't
wash regularly enough.
Although officials claim he possesses a
lively sense of humour that belies his
rather hairshirt image, on this occasion it
suffered a serious failure. Realising the
joke was doing the rounds of Iranian mobile
phones, the notoriously temperamental
president lodged an official complaint with
Iran's judiciary department.
That in turn has acted as a pretext for an
official purge of the SMS system in the
country. Mr Ahmadinejad has since told his
staff to pay close attention to all jokes
circulating about him by text.
An anti-regime website called Rooz Online
claims that under the crackdown the head of
the country's mobile phone company has been
sacked and four people arrested and accused
of colluding with the Israeli foreign
intelligence service, Mossad.
But poking fun at the president has becoming
a national pastime in Iran. In a fusillade
of seditious traffic, the regime's senior
figures and its most sacred policies are all
fair game - with Mr Ahmadinejad a particular
target.
One joke tells of a man who has died and
gone to hell, where he sees the famously
strait-laced Mr Ahmadinejad dancing with the
Hollywood star Jennifer Lopez. "Is this
Ahmadinejad's punishment?" he asks.
"No," goes the reply. "It is Jennifer
Lopez's punishment."
Another recent joke poked fun at Iran's
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
listing characteristics he supposedly
inherited from five prophets: Muhammad,
Moses, Jesus, Noah and Solomon. Insulting
the supreme leader - or the prophets - is a
jailing offence in devoutly religious Iran.
Others concentrate heavily on sex, another
taboo with Iran's religious hierarchy. One
purports to reveal official statistics of
what men do after sex: "2% eat; 3% smoke; 4%
take a shower; 5% go to sleep: 86% get up
and go home to their wives."
The previous assumption was that this
exchange of bawdy jibes and political satire
could be made without detection. But now
senior police officers have announced that
they are acutely aware of it and say jokes
intercepted could be treated as criminal
behaviour.
Particular attention is being paid to jokes
comparing Iran's nuclear programme with sex.
Several people are widely believed to have
received court summonses for sending
nuclear-related jokes.
"While the outcome of the recent arrests in
connection with SMS messaging is not clear
yet, what is certain is that SMS jokes have
already put some people into serious
trouble," wrote the website Rooz Online.
The clampdown is in line with the
authorities' uncompromising stance on the
internet and bloggers. Wary of modern
communications as a means of spreading
political dissent, Iran is second only to
China in the number of websites it filters -
using technology made in America.
Large numbers of the nation's estimated
70,000 to 100,000 bloggers have faced
harassment or imprisonment. The regime has
acknowledged monitoring text message
traffic. It first admitted it had access to
text traffic last December when a military
plane carrying more than 100 journalists
crashed shortly after take-off at Tehran
airport.
The communications minister said text
messages were kept by the government for six
months and that messages sent by those on
board in the moments before the crash could
be used to investigate its causes.
The first arrests over text messaging were
made in the run-up to last year's
presidential election when several
anti-regime student leaders were detained
for urging a boycott of the poll after the
regime had declared voting to be an Islamic
duty. "I was arrested for one evening and
they made it clear they knew every SMS I had
sent and received," said Muhammad Hashemi,
leader of the Tahkim Vahdat student
movement.
China
Steps Into Iran Nuclear Row
April 14, 2006
ITN
itn.co.uk
link to original article
China
has insisted that diplomacy is the key to
resolving Iran's stand-off with the West as
the US issues fresh warnings. The comments
came as Condoleezza Rice said the Iranian
regime was isolating itself from the
international community and had done nothing
to show they would follow guidelines
regarding their atomic programme.
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, briefing
reporters on President Hu Jintao's visit to
the US next week, said all international
issues of common concern would be discussed.
He said: "We hope all parties will adopt a
cool-headed approach. Dialogue is better
than confrontation. We should work together
toward this end."
Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Iran had
told him it would step up efforts to answer
questions on its nuclear plans.
Tehran meanwhile rejected calls to halt work
the West says is designed to make weapons.
ElBaradei is due to report to the UN
Security Council at the end of April.
Meanwhile, North Korea has said it might
boost its nuclear deterrent if China-hosted
six-country talks on ending its atomic
programmes.
If All Else Fails, Limit Iran's Gas Imports
April 14, 2006
Newsday
Rep. Steve Israel
link to original article
The world was buffeted this week by reports
that Iran had enriched uranium, while the
Pentagon was developing military plans to
respond. I have watched this crisis from two
vantage points. First, from my seat on the
House Armed Services Committee, where I
agree with officials that Iran simply cannot
continue any program that leads to nuclear
weapons. Second, from a seat I recently
occupied at a private lunch with Rep. Mark
Kirk (R-Ill.) and Javad Zarif, Iran's
ambassador to the United Nations.
We ate in a dining room decorated,
incongruously, with artwork by the Jewish
artist Marc Chagal, whose paintings also
hang in the Israeli Knesset.
The food was abundant, but the message was
clear: Iran would not end its nuclear
program, had no fear of U.S. military action
and was unconcerned by its growing isolation
in the world.
Are we on a collision course? Is a military
strike our only option? The fact is that our
response in Iran is like a Rubik's Cube:
Every move we make presents seemingly
unsolvable complications elsewhere.
Start with Iraq. Any pressure we place on
Iran - whether diplomatic, economic or
military - will likely result in Tehran's
using its considerable influence in Iraq to
incite more violence against our troops. A
diplomatic or economic solution by the
United Nations Security Council? Since 2000,
40 percent of the world's increased demand
for oil has come from China alone, and 12
percent of China's oil imports come from
Iran. China, of course, has veto power on
the UN Security Council.
Some have suggested that we seek an
accommodation, perhaps a formal accord
promising nonbelligerence. Others have
proposed allowing Iran to develop a slow,
incremental civilian nuclear research
program in exchange for intrusive,
verifiable International Atomic Energy
Agency inspections.
Although we should flesh out the details of
these ideas, I am skeptical that adequate
safeguards can be developed. I am
particularly concerned that a slow and
incremental nuclear program in Iran will
lead to a slow and incremental nuclear
program in Saudi Arabia, then Egypt, then
Syria and proliferate throughout the world.
Other nonmilitary options - including covert
activities to disrupt Iranian centrifuges
and boycotts by nuclear suppliers - are
similarly problematic.
This leads us to the military options. All
we need to do is look at Iraq to understand
the difficulties of a military response in
Iran. In fact, during an unofficial war game
on Iran, one former National Security
Council official said, "Compared with Iraq,
Iran has three times the population, four
times the land area and five times the
problems."
Some suggest precision strikes at Iran's
nuclear facilities. But Iran has protected
its facilities by burying them deep
underground and dispersing them widely.
There may be hundreds of targets, and if we
miss a few important ones, Iran will likely
retaliate with 1,200- mile-range missiles.
Additionally, virtually every military tool
at our disposal - from limited and surgical
to a major land war aimed at regime change -
is affected by oil. Iran could blockade the
Straits of Hormuz and choke the supply of
oil necessary to keep the lights on in the
Pentagon and the tanks filled in our fighter
jets, and double the price of U.S. fuel.
Still, there is one option to consider
before resorting to war. Iran may be a major
exporter of oil, but it imports 40 percent
of its gasoline because it has a limited
refining capacity. And like us, its
population is sensitive to the price of gas
in an uncertain economy.
If diplomatic, economic and other tools
don't work in dissuading the Iranian regime
from its nuclear ambitions, reducing the
amount of gas that goes into Iran may. Doing
so would dramatically increase the cost of
gasoline in Iran and put political pressure
on the government to rethink its nuclear
program and isolation in the world. A global
commitment to keeping gas out of Iran is
more effective and manageable than keeping
oil in.
I believe strongly that the most effective
and least risky approach will be sustained
diplomatic pressure on Tehran. But if all
these tools truly fail, a gas blockade is
far better than the options that occupy the
extremes: Iran with a nuclear bomb or U.S.
combat operations in yet another Mideast
country. Our military planners should be
considering it carefully. We have learned in
Iraq that a military mission that looks easy
to accomplish can be exceedingly difficult
to maintain.
Rep. Steve Israel (D-Huntington) is a member
of the House Armed Services Committee.
Iran
Strike 'Any Time'
April 14, 2006
Mirror
Mirror.co.uk
link to original article
An attack on Iran could be launched at any
time by the US, a former British ambassador
warned yesterday. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UN
envoy before the Iraq invasion, said:
"Military action is an option from now on."
But he urged the US to use diplomacy before
resorting to force. He said: "The use of
force in most circumstances is a sign of
failure by diplomacy.
"It not only has to be seen as a last resort
but as an extremely reluctant last resort."
Sir Jeremy also urged America to get UN
backing.
Delusion and Denial
April 13, 2006
St. Petersburg Times
A Times Editorial
link to original article
The Bush administration denies that it has
plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities,
but that country is a bigger threat than
Iraq ever was.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says
published reports about secret U.S. plans to
attack Iran's nuclear facilities are
"fantasyland." But whose fantasy? Rumsfeld
and President Bush were similarly dismissive
of earlier reports, since substantiated,
that the president was committed to go to
war in Iraq long before he publicly gave up
on diplomacy. So the administration's
denials about Iran aren't being taken too
seriously.
And maybe they aren't intended to be. For
make no mistake: Iran's nuclear weapons
program, unlike Iraq's, is real and
dangerous, and it would be irresponsible of
the Bush administration not to prepare for
every contingency, including the possibility
of pre-emptive military action. Leaks of the
Pentagon's plans in the New Yorker and other
publications could succeed where diplomatic
pressure has so far failed, creating enough
fear and doubt to slow the Tehran regime's
headlong rush toward nuclear weapons.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's gloating
announcement this week of Iran's advance in
the enrichment of uranium was a clear
repudiation of the U.N. Security Council's
toothless warnings.
The specter of a nuclear arsenal controlled
by Iran's extremist clerics demands military
preparedness. Still, an imminent U.S.
military strike in Iran would be an act of
almost suicidal recklessness. First, Iran's
nuclear facilities are believed to be so
scattered and well fortified that even
massive air strikes might not eliminate
them. Second, Iran's regime is far more
powerful than Saddam Hussein ever was. It
could retaliate against any attack by
destabilizing the world oil market,
unleashing Hezbollah and other terrorist
groups and fomenting tensions throughout the
Islamic world.
Fortunately, Iran is still believed to be a
few years away from completing a nuclear
weapon. But responding effectively to Iran
before time runs out will require the Bush
administration to rebuild the internal
credibility and international support it has
squandered - along with oceans of blood and
treasure - in Iraq.
In recent years, Presidents George H.W. Bush
and Bill Clinton built strong international
alliances to respond to genuine threats in
regions of strategic concern. A true
coalition of the willing - including broad
support from Islamic governments - repelled
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Innovative use of
NATO's resources in the Balkans belatedly
ended the most systematic campaign of
genocide Europe had endured since World War
II. Diverting Tehran's nuclear ambitions and
bolstering the Iranian people's democratic
aspirations will require similar leadership
from an administration that has spent the
past few years lost in isolated delusions of
fantasyland.
After Diplomacy Fails
April 13, 2006
The Washington Post
Mark Helprin
link to original article
Even were one to believe that, despite its
low and stagnant per capita gross national
product and having the world's
second-largest reserves of petroleum and
natural gas, Iran would invest
uneconomically in nuclear power generation,
one would also have to disbelieve that it
wanted nuclear weapons. But with an
intermediate-range strategic nuclear
capacity, it could deter American
intervention, reign over the Persian Gulf,
further separate Europe from American Middle
East policy, correct a nuclear imbalance
with Pakistan, lead and perhaps unify the
Islamic world, and thus create the chance to
end Western dominance of the Middle East
and/or with a single shot destroy Israel.
Iran's claim of innocuous nuclear ambitions
comports both with the Islamic doctrine of
taqqiya (literal truth need not be conveyed
to infidels) and the Western doctrine of
state secrecy (the same thing), and it is
part of a strategy of deception and false
compromise deployed to buy time. After
almost three years, the Bush administration
has maneuvered the International Atomic
Energy Agency to refer Iran to the U.N.
Security Council, where it will fall under
the protection of Russia and China, which
will make any resolution meaningless or veto
it outright. In the event of sanctions, Iran
can sell oil to China in exchange for all
the manufactures it might need, trade on the
black market and eventually reenter the
world economy after the inevitable unveiling
of Iranian nuclear weapons stimulates the
resignation of the West.
Were Russia not playing a double game, it
would not have agreed in December to upgrade
the Iranian air force and sell Iran 29 SA-15
SAMs for the protection of key facilities.
Russia and China can operate in
contradiction of what many assume to be
their self-interest because they have always
had a different appreciation of and doctrine
relating to nuclear weapons, because they
are willing to live dangerously and because
they are the least likely targets. In
addition, the agitation that they support
roils the smooth surface of the Pax
Americana to their maximum opportunity and
relief. For example, chaos in the Middle
East makes Russia in comparison a stable
supplier of energy and shifts European
resources and dependency to Russia's
advantage.
Other than the likely nothing, what will the
United States have done in the months and
years ahead to prepare for the failure of
diplomacy and sanctions? The obvious option
is an aerial campaign to divest Iran of its
nuclear potential: i.e., clear the Persian
Gulf of Iranian naval forces, scrub
anti-ship missiles from the shore and lay
open antiaircraft-free corridors to each
target. With the furious capacity of its new
weapons, the United States can accomplish
this readily. Were the targets effectively
hidden or buried, Iran could be shut down,
coerced and perhaps revolutionized by the
simple and rapid destruction of its oil
production and transport. The Iranians know
their obvious vulnerabilities, but are we
aware of ours?
In this war with a newly revived militant
Islam, we think systematically and they
think imaginatively. As we strain to bring
the genius of imagination to our systems,
they attempt to bring systematic discipline
to their imagination, and neither of us is
precluded from success. Despite our superior
power, its diminution by geography,
overcommittment and politics means that they
might confound us. And because they believe
absolutely in the miraculous, one must
credit their stated aim to defeat us in the
short term by hurling our armies from the
Middle East and in the long term by causing
the collapse of Western civilization.
If, like his predecessors Saladin, the Mahdi
of Sudan and Nasser, Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad goes for the long shot,
he may have in mind to draw out and damage
any American onslaught with his thousands of
surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft
guns; by a concentrated air and naval attack
to sink one or more major American warships;
and to mobilize the Iraqi Shia in a general
uprising, with aid from infiltrated
Revolutionary Guard and conventional
elements, that would threaten U.S. forces in
Iraq and sever their lines of supply. This
by itself would be a victory for those who
see in the colors of martyrdom, but if he
could knock us back and put enough of our
blood in the water, the real prize might
come into reach. That is: to make such a
fury in the Islamic world that, as it has
done before and not long ago, it would throw
over caution in favor of jihad. As simply as
it can be said, were Egypt to close the
canal, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to
lock up their airspace -- which, with their
combined modern air forces, they could --
the U.S. military in Iraq and the Gulf,
bereft of adequate supply, would be
beleaguered and imperiled.
In trying to push the Iraqi snake by its
tail, we have lost sight of the larger
strategic picture, of which such events,
though very unlikely, may become a part. But
because the Iranian drive for deployable
nuclear weapons will take years, we have a
period of grace. In that time, we would do
well to strengthen -- in numbers and mass as
well as quality -- the means with which we
fight, to reinforce the fleet train with
which to supply the fighting lines, and to
plan for a land route from the Mediterranean
across Israel and Jordan to the Tigris and
Euphrates. And even if we cannot extricate
ourselves from nation-building and
counterinsurgency in Iraq, we must have a
plan for remounting the army there so that
it can fight and maneuver as it was born to
do.
To make these provisions will secure our
flanks and give us a freer hand in the
potentially difficult project of denying to
a rogue nation of 68 million people, with a
well-developed military and a penchant for
rash action, the nuclear weapons it is bent
on acquiring and rushing to construct. Our
problem in Iraq has been delusion and lack
of foresight. Iran is bigger and more
powerful. What a pity it would be either to
do nothing or once again to lurch forward
with neither strategy nor thought.
The writer, a novelist and journalist,
served in the Israeli army and air force. He
is a senior fellow of the Claremont
Institute. This article will also appear in
the Claremont Review of Books.
Rafsanjani in Syria on Talks with US and
Terror Groups
April 13, 2006
Arabic News
ArabicNews.com
link to original article
Upcoming talks between Tehran and Washington
on Iraq could, if they turn out to be
successful, pave the way for talks on other
issues, Expediency Council Chairman Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani was quoted by Al-Hayat
daily today.
Speaking exclusively with the London-based
daily, Rafsanjani said that the Iran-US
talks would only focus on developments in
Iraq.
Al Hayat, on its website Thursday, further
quoted Rafsanjani as speculating that "if
Iran and US are satisfied with the outcome
of their talks this would encourage them to
discuss other issues." "New ways will be
created to encourage further talks if the
two sides reach a successful outcome in
their upcoming dialogue," Rafsanjani was
quoted in the website as saying.
But he made it clear that Iran's nuclear
case would not be in the agenda of the
talks.
As for Tehran-Damascus relations, the cleric
informed that the "two sides would continue
their cooperation on issues related to
Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq." He said that
further US pressures on Iran and Syria would
only draw them closer than ever.
According to Al Hayat, Rafsanjani was of the
view that Saudi Arabia could play an
"effective role in lessening tensions
between Iran and the US." "Given the wisdom
of the Saudi king, we are sure that he can
help settle issues in the entire region,"
Rafsanjani was further quoted by the daily.
Rafsanjani is currently in Syria at the
invitation of President Bashar al-Assad. He
arrived in Damascus on Wednesday.
Rafsanjani said Wednesday evening that the
various Lebanese groups should not let
differences of opinion change the country
into a battlefield of sectarian conflicts.
At a meeting with Secretary-General of the
Lebanese Hizbullah Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah
at the Iranian embassy in Damascus,
Rafsanjani said unity among the different
Lebanese resistance groups was the key
factor that secured their survival as well
as continuation of the struggle against
occupation.
On Tuesday, US State Department Spokesman
Sean McCormack said Iran "is the central
banker for terrorism in the Middle East.
It's probably the most significant state
sponsor of terrorism around the world. It is
a supporter of Hizbullah. It is a supporter
of Palestinian rejectionist groups."
Rafsanjani said Wednesday that the situation
in Muslim countries including Iraq,
Palestine and Lebanon have changed to the
confusion of the US.
Meeting with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Secretary-General Ramadan Shalah Rafsanjani
said the "US has not succeeded in its
hostile policies toward Islamic countries as
evidenced by the defeat of their ominous
plots through the continued defiance and
struggle of Muslim states."
Praising the Palestinian resistance against
the occupying Israelis, Rafsanjani said the
people of Palestine were currently passing
through a very "sensitive" period in their
history which calls for all parties to unite
in the common struggle to liberate Palestine
from the yoke of its oppressors.
Iran's
Nukes: Russia's Key
April 13, 2006
New York Post
Amir Taheri
link to original article
As the diplomatic maneuvers to pressure Iran
to rein in its nuclear ambitions continue,
the message one hears in policy circles in
most capitals is simple: The key is in
Moscow. Of all the powers involved in this
showdown with the Islamic Republic, only
Russia is in a position to tip the balance
between a peaceful resolution or war.
Russia is building Iran's first and, so far,
only nuclear power plant near Bushehr. It
could slow or suspend the project pending a
diplomatic resolution of the crisis. Such a
move could strengthen the hands of those
within the Tehran establishment that want a
moratorium on uranium processing to prevent
tension from further escalating.
And Russia has another card to play: It has
proposed to set up a special-uranium
enrichment project for Iran to cover the
needs of the Bushehr plant for its full
37-year lifespan. (An agreement now in place
has Russia providing the plant's fuel for
its first 10 years.) To sweeten it for the
Tehran leadership, the Russian proposal
could be modified to have part of the
enrichment process done in Iranian
facilities and with the participation of
Iranian scientists and technicians.
All that, however, may lead nowhere. Some
analysts suspect that President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad may actually want a military
conflict with the United States as the
opening shot in his promised "Clash of
Civilizations." He seems convinced that
America, plagued by bitter internal
dissension, lacks the stomach for a serious
fight with the Islamic Republic and its
radical allies throughout the Middle East.
Thus he may want a clash over the nuclear
issue, which many Iranians (thanks to the
regime's Goebbelsian presentation) see as a
matter of national pride.
But even then Russia could either prevent a
clash or hasten it by vetoing or voting for
a strong resolution in the U.N. Security
Council. The Russian position there is
crucial because China, which also has a
veto, would not be prepared to isolate
itself by siding with Iran if Russia sides
with the United States. If Russia vetoes, so
will China. If Russia doesn't veto, the most
that China might do to please Iran is to
abstain.
The Bush administration knows all this.
That's why it's starting to build pressure
on Russia ahead of this July's G-8 summit,
which Russian President Vladimir Putin is to
host. The American calculation is that
Putin, having won the presidency of the G-8
for Russia for the first time, is unlikely
to start his tenure by splitting the group
to please the Iranian mullahs.
Yet Putin won't want to make an unambiguous
choice between Tehran and Washington. Russia
needs the Islamic Republic for a number of
reasons - including as part of Moscow's
strategy to counter U.S. influence in
Central Asia, the Caspian basin and the
Middle East.(Tehran and Moscow have been
working closely in Afghanistan for more than
a decade; they're now developing a joint
strategy in anticipation of U.S. withdrawal
once President Bush leaves office.)
Moscow also needs Tehran to prevent the
United States from imposing its proposed
model for the exploitation of the Caspian
Sea's immense oil and gas resources.And,
having lost all of its Soviet-era Arab
friends and clients, Moscow also needs
Tehran as a bridgehead to the Middle East,
the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
The current analysis in Moscow is that, once
Bush is gone, Iran will emerge as the
dominant power in Iraq and would need Russia
as a strategic partner in developing such
major oilfields as Majnun which sit astride
the Irano-Iraqi frontier.
The United States is not the only strategic
rival that Russia has identified. Also
looming large on the horizon is China which,
Putin's recent visit to Beijing
notwithstanding, many Moscow analysts see as
a potential threat to Russian interests in
Asia and the Middle East. A Sino-Iranian
axis could isolate Russia in Western Asia
and the Middle East and even shut it out of
chunks of Central Asia.
Add to all that Russia's immense economic
interest in the Islamic Republic. Iran is
now the biggest market for Russian arms,
including aircraft and submarines. The loss
of the Iranian orders might force entire
lines of Russian weapons industries to close
down.
The two neighbors have also signed trade
contracts worth $80 billion over the next
decade. And Russia hopes to build most of
the seven nuclear power plants that the
Islamic Republic wants to set up in the next
10 years. More than 30,000 Russian
technicians, both military and civilian, now
work in Iran.
There is one more, and (according to Russian
analysts) perhaps more important, factor:
Putin can never be sure that, come the
crunch, Washington will not strike a deal
with Tehran, leaving Moscow in the lurch.
Iranian author Amir Taheri is a member of
Benador Associates.
In The Club
April 12, 2006
The Economist
Middle East & Africa
link to original article
Now that Iran has enriched uranium, can
America talk to it about Iraq?
“I AM officially announcing that Iran has
joined...those countries which have nuclear
technology,” said Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
Iran's president, on April 11th. “This is
the result of the Iranian nation's
resistance.” By enriching a quantity of
uranium at its pilot plant at Natanz, in
defiance of pleas from the United Nations
Security Council, Iran this week
strengthened suspicions that it is trying to
build a nuclear weapon and shifted its
confrontation with America into a higher
gear. Even if it has achieved only 3.5%
enrichment as it claims—far short of the
level required to power a bomb—it marks a
significant technical breakthrough. It was a
step, said both the Americans and the
Russians, in the wrong direction.
Oddly enough, Iran's announcement came amid
a flurry of speculation that America and
Iran were talking to each other. Indeed, not
since 2002, when domestic infighting
scotched an Iranian effort to negotiate
secretly with the United States, has Tehran
been so abuzz with talk about talks. Few
believe official claims that Muhammad
Nahavandian's recent trip to Washington, DC,
was “personal”. As a member of the Supreme
National Security Council (SNSC) of a
country George Bush regards as a major
threat to world peace, it may be wondered
how Mr Nahavandian breezed through American
immigration.
Other SNSC men are standing by to conduct
talks, of a much more open nature, with
American officials in Baghdad. These would
be about ending sectarian violence in Iraq.
But the officials may have to continue to
stand by: the likelihood of such meetings
happening, let alone achieving anything, is
receding amid fiery speculation that America
is planning military attacks on Iran if
diplomacy fails to persuade it to stop its
nuclear production.
Ali Larijani, the head of the SNSC, joined
President Bush in pooh-poohing an article in
the current New Yorker by Seymour Hersh, an
investigative journalist, suggesting that
America is considering the use of nuclear
weapons to destroy Iran's underground
nuclear facilities. Mr Larijani depicted
such “psychological warfare” as evidence of
America's “impotence” in the face of Iran's
determination to produce nuclear fuel. Bold
talk, but Iran's nervousness was revealed by
its enthusiasm in taking up last month's
request by Abdulaziz al-Hakim, an Iraqi Shia
leader with good ties to his Iranian
co-religionists, that it accept America's
long-standing offer of talks aimed
exclusively at trying to end the violence in
Iraq. But the Americans themselves now seem
cooler towards the idea of any talks—at
least until the current, fractious efforts
to form a government in Iraq have ended. A
State Department official accused the
Iranians of talking up negotiations only
because “they find themselves under the
scrutiny...of the international community
concerning their nuclear activities.”
Embarrassed, the Iranians are now
backtracking, with the government insisting
that it is in no hurry at all to talk.
Scant comfort, then, for those who long for
an end to decades of American-Iranian
enmity. The top American and Iranian envoys
in Baghdad have already met “at least once”,
says a well-connected Western diplomat.
Rumour has it that a senior Iranian
negotiator has also visited Iraq. But there
is no sign that Mr Bush is receptive to
overtures aimed at detente. The
administration recently secured Congress's
approval to give $75m to Iranian opposition
groups.
Convinced that Mr Bush intends to try to
topple them, Iran's leaders do not disguise
their pleasure at America's Iraqi travails.
The mayhem in Iraq, they believe, acts as a
brake on Mr Bush's ambitions in Iran. But
the Iranians are not as pervasive or as
pernicious an influence in Iraq as the
United States—and some Sunni Arab countries,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular—say
they are. A recent report by the
International Crisis Group argues that such
reports are exaggerated.
To be sure, the Iranians flaunt the good
relations that they have had for many years
with Mr Hakim's Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and with the
Dawa Party of the current embattled prime
minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari. They also get
on with Iraq's (Kurdish) president, Jalal
Talabani. Equally, few doubt that Iran's
spies are numerous, and its tradesmen and
charity workers diligent.
But Iran remains mistrusted by many Iraqis,
including many of the Shias who fought in
large numbers against their Iranian
co-religionists during the Iran-Iraq war in
the 1980s. It is doubtful, for instance,
whether Iran, even if it wanted to, could
put a stop to the anti-Sunni violence that
is being perpetrated by SCIRI's associates.
Nor does Mr Hakim, although he is a cleric
and spent many years in exile in Iran, seek
to replicate Iran's theocratic government.
Privately, he is scathing about it.
All the same, a grey area surrounds the
continuing failure of Iraq's main Sunni and
Kurdish factions, backed in this instance by
the United States, to persuade Mr Jaafari to
stand down. Officials in Tehran disclaim
Iranian involvement in government-building,
but Hassan Kazemi Qomi, Iran's chargé
d'affaires in Baghdad, confirms that Iran
differs strongly from America about how much
power Iraq's Shia groups should exercise.
Iran's support for Mr Jaafari has won it
thanks of a sort from Muqtada al-Sadr, a
prime-ministerial ally whose Mahdi Army has
fought intermittently against the Americans.
Iran finds the volatile cleric a useful
squeeze on the influential (and
Iranian-born) Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
whose influence over Shia communities around
the world is a source of chagrin to Iran's
clerical elite. In January, Mr Sadr
elliptically threatened to retaliate against
American interests if the United States
attacked Iran. He is said to have received
Iranian arms. But his animus towards
Persians is known; there is no trust on
either side.
Iran's vulnerable demography—it has big
Sunni Arab and Kurd populations on its
borders with Iraq—militates against too
overt an involvement in sectarian violence.
The Iranians blamed recent bomb blasts in
the partly Arab province of Khuzestan on
Arab separatists pushing a militant Sunni
agenda. If, as the Americans believe, Iran
has helped Sunni militants to get into Iraq,
this may be as much to avoid entanglements
as to provoke them.
The Iranians will not be reassured by Mr
Hersh's assertion that America has special
forces within Iran. They have fears, shared
by the Turks, that the Americans are egging
on the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan,
an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
whose separatist struggle in Turkey recently
came bloodily back to life. Last month at
least three members of Iran's Revolutionary
Guard were killed, apparently by members of
the group.
It is hard to see how Mr Bush can secure
Iran's co-operation in Iraq, for what that
is worth, without offering concessions. But
Mr Bush will not be keen to conciliate a
hostile state that seems only to be
accelerating its quest for nuclear weapons.
Iran:
Crossing the Redline?
April 12, 2006
Stratfor
stratfor.com
link to original article
Iranian officials are trumpeting a major
advance in their country's nuclear program.
Here is what it means -- and does not mean.
Analysis
Former Iranian President and Chairman of the
Expediency Council Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani announced April 11 that Iran has
successfully completed an enrichment cascade
using 164 gas centrifuges, Kuwaiti state
news agency KUNA announced. Such a cascade
would empower Iran to produce a richer
fissile blend of uranium for use in nuclear
power plant fuel or perhaps a nuclear
weapon.
Technically, the announcement means that
Iran has established its ability to enrich
uranium in something other than very small
amounts. The Iranians are, however, not yet
at the point that they can make weapons or
fabricate nuclear fuel to run a reactor. A
weapons program will require several of
these cascades, and a power program requires
dozens of them. Establishing enrichment
cascades on that scale is still -- at bare
minimum -- several months off. And even once
that is achieved, enriched uranium would
need to be fabricated into fuel for a
reactor, or go through a weaponization
process if it is to have military value.
Neither process is simple, quick or cheap.
Politically, however, this step has
immediate implications. In Europe,
enrichment of any kind, much less on an
industrial scale as the Iranians are clearly
aiming for, is a redline. Once the Iranians
move past enrichment, information on their
nuclear weapons program can be garnered only
through intensive intelligence efforts.
Iran's announcement means that European
states that see a limited reason to
participate in such intelligence efforts no
longer feel they have any leverage in
negotiations. Europe will now simply put its
relatively disinterested diplomatic efforts
behind the United States and let Washington
run the show. It is not carte blanche -- the
Europeans still do not want military action
-- but it is close.
For Israel, the issue is more complex. As
noted above, enrichment does not
automatically equate to weaponization.
Israel, unlike Europe, has a deep and
abiding interest in directing intelligence
efforts against Tehran. Thus, Israel's
picture of the Iranian nuclear program is
more complete than Europe's. As one would
expect, this deeper awareness and interest
translates into a different redline, likely
somewhere in the weaponization process. The
world can be certain that Iran has not yet
stepped over Israel's redline; after all,
Tehran is still a city, not a crater.
But ultimately the Iranian announcement is
about the United States. Iran and Washington
are currently -- for the first time in a
generation -- engaged in direct talks,
officially about all topics Iraqi. This
revelation, like the U.S. leaks over the
weekend that nuclear strike options against
Iran had been drawn up, are all part of the
ebb and flow of those negotiations.
Iran
is Racing Down Nuclear Route Before UN Can
Put Up Roadblock
April 13, 2006
The Times
Bronwen Maddox
link to original article
Iran's
sudden announcement this week that it has
begun enriching uranium presents the world
with two riddles. First, is Iran now set on
having a nuclear weapon? It says not. But
the most plausible interpretation of its
behaviour is that it wants to put itself
within easy reach of one.
Secondly, can diplomatic pressure persuade
it to drop those ambitions? A plausible
answer is that the United Nations might
eventually persuade it to freeze its work —
but almost certainly not to scrap what it
has achieved.
On that view, the best interpretation of
this week’s events is that Iran is pressing
ahead as fast as it can so that, if it does
ever strike a deal, it surrenders as little
ground as possible.
Yesterday the countries that have most
energetically tried to persuade Iran to
leave the nuclear road joined together to
condemn its action.
It was important for the hopes of any
diplomatic pressure that Russia and China,
both permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council, added their voices to that
declaration.
The United States, Britain and France, the
other permanent members, have been vigorous
in wanting to ratchet up pressure on Tehran,
but Russia and China have held back. Iran
has gone to great lengths to sign intricate
and lucrative energy deals with Russia and
China, and they stand to lose most if the UN
moves towards sanctions.
Russia pointedly added yesterday that it
believed that force could not resolve the
dispute. Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign
Minister, said that military plans “could
create a dangerous explosive blaze in the
Middle East, where there are already enough
blazes”.
Wang Guangya, China’s UN Ambassador, said
“to talk about military and other sanctions
will not be helpful”.
Weekend reports in the US suggested that the
Bush Administration was keeping the option
of military action open, at least in theory,
even though President Bush dismissed the
talk as “wild speculation”.
Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State,
said yesterday that the Security Council,
which has told Tehran to halt all enrichment
work by April 28, would need to “take strong
steps to make certain (to) maintain the
credibility of the international community”.
“When the Security Council reconvenes this
month,” Ms Rice said: “I think it will be
time for action. We can’t let this
continue.”
Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN
watchdog, will arrive in Tehran today to
seek full co-operation with the Security
Council and IAEA.
Many analysts have argued that the
provocative timing of the move, in the
middle of the 30-day period set by the
council for freezing the work, is an attempt
to secure Iran’s position, and present a
fait accompli.
Iran is likely to argue that it cannot be
expected to give up all of a programme
showing steady technical progress. “They
clearly have no intention of stopping”, Gary
Samore, proliferation expert at the
MacArthur Foundation in Chicago, said.
Mark Fitzpatrick, of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London,
argued that “negotiating with a country to
roll back” a programme was rarely successful
— witness the success of North Korea in
holding on to its work in the face of
intense international pressure.
European officials believe that the best
chance for diplomacy may be to force Iran
into the position of rejecting an offer that
all members of the Security Council regard
as self- evidently reasonable.
One version of this has been mooted by
British officials — that the five permanent
members of the council, plus Germany, offer
a return to talks provided that Iran freezes
its enrichment and submits to all IAEA
inspections.
Iran’s move this week appears designed to
make even that attempt look out of date.