۲۰۰۵

April,14, 2006

 
 

Iran's reckless rhetoric provocative, alarming

 

Apr. 14, 2006. 01:00 AM

RICHARD GWYN

 ttp://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1144965013190&call_pageid=968256290204&col=968350116795

The good news about Iran's declaration that it has "successfully mastered nuclear technology" is that it is, almost certainly, a lie. The bad news is that even though the claim can quite easily be exposed as either a lie or, at best, a wild exaggeration, spokesmen in Tehran nevertheless made it.

There is in Iran's behaviour a quality of extremism, of recklessness, of illogicality — something close to a suicidal call: "Bomb us"— that mocks all the policies of diplomacy, moderation and patience, that are always being urged on the outside world, most especially on the U.S., as the best way to deal with Tehran.

Iran, of course, has a perfect right to develop a nuclear power program. Whether it really needs nuclear power given its huge oil and gas reserves is questionable but that it no way diminishes its right to spend money on nuclear power research.

But there's no requirement for secrecy in nuclear power research, and no justification whatever for lying about what it was doing, especially in progress toward enriching uranium, a vital step on the road to making a bomb. This is what Iran did, to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In a deal offered by Russia, Iran could have had all the enriched uranium it needed for nuclear power development, but in a safe, internationally controlled way. Iran rejected this offer.

This week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad boasted that "uranium with the desired enrichment for nuclear power" had been achieved. A day later, a senior Iranian atomic energy official declared that mass production of enriched uranium (by 54,000 centrifuges rather than the mere 164 supposedly already operating) would start soon.

No expert believes a word of this. Iran does have able scientists. But its technology and engineering capabilities are crude. Its oil industry is exceptionally inefficient. Its civil airplanes constantly break down. Nuclear analysts believe it will take Iran at least five years, and quite possibly 15, to develop a single, crude bomb.

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington dismisses the latest claims as "little more than vacuous political posturing."

The end objective of all of this may be nothing more than domestic politics. International criticism, most especially by the U.S., of Iran's nuclear program, has inspired an upsurge of patriotism that has made the mullah-led regime more popular than it has been in decades.

The scary alternative explanation is that Iran's end objective in being so provocative is to provoke.

In the current New Yorker magazine, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh claims that "intensified planning" is underway in Washington for a major air attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.

President George W. Bush has flatly denied this. He would do this no matter what was actually going on. In practical fact, contingency planning has to be underway.

An actual American air attack would severely delay Iran's nuclear program.

Iran would suffer terrible damage. But the U.S. would also be damaged. Its last shreds of support in the Arab world would vanish. Terrorist attacks, as on American troops in Iraq, would multiply. Iran might be able to choke off oil shipments from Saudi Arabia through the Straits of Hormuz or, at the very least, reduce them sharply. A global recession would become a real possibility.

Iran's behaviour is reckless, almost suicidal, much in the way it sent tens of thousands of its soldiers to certain deaths in World War I-type mass attacks during its war with Iraq in the 1980s.

But not entirely this time. The Cold War was governed by the doctrine of MAD — Mutual Assured Destruction. For each side, the cost of "victory" was too high. So neither moved against the other.

Iran today may be conducting a sort of pre-nuclear version of MAD.

Which isn't to say that what's now happening isn't pure madness. On both sides.

 

US warns Iran of nuclear consequences

Friday 14 April 2006

http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/7F256ED3-5729-4996-85A0-70FE18D8F625.htm

 

Rice has said Iran is defying the "international community"

The US secretary of state says her country "would look at the full range of options" available to the UN Security Council to respond to Iran's defiance of council resolutions on its nuclear programme.

Condoleezza Rice told reporters on Thursday that there will "have to be some consequence" for Iran's refusal to suspend uranium enrichment activities, as the Security Council president demanded in a statement two weeks ago.

Rice spoke to reporters after a meeting with Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay.

"There is no doubt that Iran continues to defy the will of the international community despite the fact that the international community very clearly said stop," Rice said.

One option, she said, is the ability to compel Iran through provisions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. These provisions permit measures to ensure that the will of the international system is carried out.

US intelligence

Earlier on Thursday, several top US intelligence officials said Iran was years from obtaining the materials and technology necessary for a nuclear weapon despite its announcement this week that it had begun enriching uranium.

Kenneth Brill, the head of the new National Counterproliferation Centre, said the Iranian government had blustered before about developments that did not readily materialise.

"We really have to see what's happened in Iran," Brill said. "There is still a very significant amount of time that needs to be worked through by the Iranians to get to where they want to go."

Defending the quality of intelligence assessments, Brill said much of what the intelligence agencies had predicted had been validated by the IAEA and others.

Tehran insists its work is only for peaceful, civilian purposes, but the US and a number of its allies think it is after a nuclear arsenal.

Dialogue urged

China on Friday said dialogue was the key to resolving the West's nuclear stand-off with Iran.

Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, briefing reporters on President Hu Jintao's visit to the United States next week, was asked whether Iran and North Korea would be raised.

Yang said all international issues of common concern would be discussed.

"We hope all parties will adopt a cool-headed approach," he told a news conference when asked about Iran. "Dialogue is better than confrontation. We should work together toward this end."

Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said on Thursday that Iran had told him it would step up efforts to answer questions on its nuclear plans.

ElBaradei is due to report to the UN Security Council at the end of April.

 

The Great Iran Debate

 

http://blog.washingtonpost.com/worldopinionroundup/2006/04/post_1.html

 

The combination of reaction to news reports of U.S. plans for military strikes on Iran and Iran's claim to have mastered uranium processing brought out the best (and worst) in the comments section.

"Robert Rose" likens a Bloomberg wire story headlined "Iran Could Make Nuclear Bomb in 16 Days, U.S. Says" to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident in which an exaggerated North Vietnamese attack on a U.S. ship prompted Congress to authorize President Johnson to expand the Vietnam War.

The headline is misleading. The U.S. official said that if Iran had 50,000 nuclear centrifuges to process uranium it could produce a bomb in 16 days. Iran has less than 200 centrifuges today. It seeks to have 3,000 by next year. The Bloomberg article quotes one expert as saying that, if Iran reaches that goal, it could produce enough fuel for a nuclear weapon in 271 days.

But to Rose's point, is the U.S. attempting to exaggerate Iran's capabilities? The U.S. has maintained all along that Iran is masking sinister ambitions in their nuclear efforts and after Iran's latest claims, Condoleezza Rice called for the U.N. to take "strong steps." What do you make of Rice's handling of U.S. policy?

"Oscar Mayer" makes an important point when he writes that "this constant tension [over Iran] adds at least $15 a barrel to the price of oil. This translates to over 200 billion dollars of our annual trade deficit or about 600 billion dollars since the Iraq invasion. Add the cost of the Iraq war and we are close to one trillion dollars that this adventure is costing us."

The geopolitics of attempting to transform the political order of the Middle East as the Bush administration seeks to do not only has the direct costs of intervention but the indirect costs associated with the region's primary exports: oil and natural gas.

"What is swept under the carpet by the US," contends HJ Pfau, "is the fact that Iran has every right to nuclear energy. This constant harping about a nuclear bomb, based on no facts whatsoever, is an American diversion designed to isolate a regime they don't like."

Not quite. Iran, as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, does have every right to nuclear energy for civilian purposes. But in 2002, IAEA inspectors discovered a secret parallel program in Iran that seemed to be aimed at creating weapons, not energy for civilian purposes. That is why the IAEA still says it cannot be certain that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons. The Bush administration may be "harping about a nuclear bomb," but the concern is not "based on no facts whatsoever."

Kris says, "I have no doubt that, barring mainstream opposition from either the US military, or the right-wing, Bush can engineer another rush to war in Iran. While a certain subset of the US population will cheer on such an avenging mission of justice and righteousness, an attack on Iran might swing the 2006 elections, but will otherwise be a devastating act of self-sabotage, on the part of America."

This is the central question raised by the talk of military strikes on Iran. Would any U.S. military action be an act of self-defense or aggression? David Patrick says, "Perhaps the last chance for a peaceful solution has already been passed."

Israel Should Support Regime Change in Iran


By Rabbi Daniel M. Zucker   April 14, 2006
http://web.israelinsider.com/views/8259.htm

It is time for Israel's Foreign Ministry to start thinking "outside the box". What is meant here is for Israel to take the offensive in its ideological war with the Islamic Republic of Iran and seek a regime change to an anti-fundamentalist government. If Israel had to create such a group, one would call the idea "fantasy". However, there already exists exactly such a group of Iranians who have a forty year track record of opposing despotism and a quarter century history of fighting Islamic fundamentalism "tooth and nail". That Iranian group is the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MeK), also known as the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), and its political alliance, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) of which the MeK is a constituent member.

Why should Israel consider supporting such Iranian resistance organizations? Israel, (and the rest of the world as well), needs to realize that not all Iranians are the same. Indeed, the vast majority of Iranians (90+%) despise the fundamentalist regime, which has hijacked the democratic revolution of 1979 and replaced it with an Islamofascist regime. The MeK and NCRI are about as different from President Ahmadinejad's E'telaf-e Abadgaran-e Iran-e Eslami (aka Abadgaran = Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran) as are ordinary Jews or Israelis from the Neturei Karta. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Iranian ayatollahs are like the Neturei Karta; indeed in mid-March a group of five members of the Neturei Karta traveled to Iran to meet with the Iranian president and to support his denial of the Holocaust and anti-Zionism. Apparently the fundamentalists have found each other, just like the old adage: "birds of a feather, flock together". If the fundamentalists can find a way to come together, bridging their religious differences, certainly anti-fundamentalists should be seeking each other out for coalitions to oppose the Islamists.

The US State Department, still covering itself decades after the Iran-Contra scandal, allowed itself to be misled by Iranian disinformation, and in seeking access to Iranian oil (20% of US oil imports) has followed an unsuccessful policy of appeasement of the Islamic Republic. In a failed effort at a quid pro quo deal with Iran, the State Department in 1997 placed the MeK on its Foreign Terrorist Organization list as a sop to the then new "moderate" President Khatami, the one who denied talking with or shaking the hand of Israel's President Moshe Katzav, when both attended the late Pope John-Paul's funeral last year. Israel, despite its role as middle-man in the Irangate fiasco, (certainly understandable when Saddam Hussein of Iraq loomed as a larger problem than Khomeini), has no need of such appeasement of the ayatollahs.

On the other hand, Israel could well afford to find new friends in her less than safe and friendly neighborhood. Turning her number one enemy into a friend and ally by supporting those who seek to create a successful regime change from a fundamentalist Islamic theocracy to a secular democracy, is definitely an act of enlightened self-interest. Incidentally, it would also be an act of concern for the establishment of human rights, the lack thereof for which Iran has been condemned 52 times in the last twenty-seven years by the United Nations. Ridding the world of the number one state sponsor of terrorism might actually top the admiration Israel earned when it took out Saddam's Osirak reactor in 1981. It would also earn Israel the eternal gratitude of the Iranian people for supporting their 27- year quest for freedom and justice.

Why the MeK and the NCRI and not some other dissident Iranian group? The MeK and NCRI have the best credentials as anti-fundamentalists. They also have the longest track record of opposing Khomeinism and Islamic fundamentalism. But more important still, despite all the false information suggesting the contrary, MeK and NCRI have the support of the majority of the Iranian people, both inside and outside of Iran.

Foreign Minister Tsipi Livni and Foreign Ministry Director General Prosor: There is a group of Iranians who seek your aid and seek to be of aid to you. Get to know each other and realize the common concerns and bonds you share. For if you fail to help each other, your common enemy will find it much easier to cause us all a lot of grief and damage.

Views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect those of israelinsider.

Despite Denials, U.S. Plans for Iran War

 

http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/04/despite_denials.html

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has been conducting theater campaign analysis for a full scale war with Iran since at least May 2003, responding to Pentagon directions to prepare for potential operations in the "near term."

The campaign analysis, called TIRANNT, for "theater Iran near term," posits an Iraq-like maneuver war between U.S. and Iranian ground forces and incorporates lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In addition to the TIRANNT effort and the Marine Corps Karona invasion scenario I discussed yesterday, the military has also completed an analysis of Iran's missile force (the "BMD-I" study), the Defense Intelligence Agency has updated "threat data" for Iranian forces, and Air Force planners have modeled attacks against "real world" Iranian air defenses and targets to establish new metrics. What is more, the United States and Britain have been conducting war games and contingency planning under a Caspian Sea scenario that could also pave the way for northern operations against Iran.

After new reports of intensified planning for Iran began to circulate over the weekend, the President dismissed the news as "wild speculation."

On Tuesday, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld similarly called media speculation about Iran war planning as "fantasyland."

Asked at a Pentagon new conference whether he had in recent days, weeks or month, asked the Joint Staff or CENTCOM to "update, refine, [or] modify the contingencies for possible military options against Iran," Rumsfeld said: "We have I don't know how many various contingency plans in this department.  And the last thing I'm going to do is to start telling you or anyone else in the press or the world at what point we refresh a plan or don't refresh a plan, and why.  It just isn't useful."

I beg to differ, Mr. Secretary.

World pressure and American diplomacy would be mightily enhanced if Iran understood that the United States was indeed so serious about it acquiring nuclear weapons it was willing to go to war over it. What is more, the American public needs to know that this is a possibility.

Think the U.S. military isn't serious about war with Iran?

Since at least 2003, in response to a number of directives from Secretary Rumsfeld and then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Myers, the military services and Pentagon intelligence agencies have been newly working on a number of "near term" and "near-year" Iranian contingency studies in support of CENTCOM war planning efforts.

These studies, war games, and modeling efforts have been the first step in shifting the bulk of planning from almost exclusive focus on Iraq to Iran. At CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida, at Army and Air Force CENTCOM support headquarters in Georgia and South Carolina, and at service analysis and operations research organizations like the Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir (thanks readers for correcting me), a monumental effort has been underway to "build" an Iran country baseline for war planning.

Under the TIRANNT campaign analysis program, Army organizations, together with CENTCOM headquarters planners, have been examining both near term and "out year" scenarios for war with Iran, covering all aspects of a major combat operation from mobilization and deployment of forces through post-war "stability" operations after regime change.

The core TIRANNT effort itself began in May 2003, when modelers and intelligence specialists pulled together the data sets needed for theater level (large scale) scenario analysis in support of updated war plans. Successive iterations of TIRANTT efforts have updated "blue," (United States), "green," (coalition), and "threat" databases with post-Iraq war information.

The follow-on TIRANNT Campaign Analysis (TIRANNT-CA), which began in October 2003, has calculated the results of different campaign scenarios against Iran to provide options for "courses of action" analysis. According to military sources close to the planning process, in 2002-2003, the CENTCOM commander, Gen. John Abizaid was directed to develop a new "strategic concept" for Iran war planning and potential courses of action for Secretary of Defense and Presidential review.

Parallel with the TIRANNT and TIRANNT-CA analysis, Army and CENTCOM planners have also been undertaking the "TOY study." TOY stands for TIRANNT Out-Year, and posits a U.S.-Iran war in the year 2011. Under the TOY modeling effort, Army division-sized formations as currently organized are sent up against real world models of Iranian ground units. The results are compared to the same engagements when fought by newly reorganized Army brigade combat teams who fight independent of a strict divisional hierarchy. The product gauges not only the impact of military "transformation" efforts in the Army but also the most propitious timing for war.

Under a separate "BMD-I study," for ballistic missile defense - Iran, the Army Concepts Analysis Agency has modeled the performance of U.S. and Iranian weapon systems to determine the number of missiles expected to "leak through" a coalition missile defense in the 2005 (current) time frame. The BMD-I study has not only looked at U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missile performance and optimum placement to protect U.S. and coalition forces, but also the results of combined air, cyber warfare and missile defense operations to disable Iranian command and control capabilities and missiles on the ground before Iran can fire them.

In July 2004, U.S. and British Army planners also met at Fort Belvoir to play the Hotspur 2004 war game, a 2015 timeframe Caspian Sea scenario examining deployment of forces, movement to "contact" with the enemy, and "decisive" operations. A U.K. medium weight brigade operated subordinate to U.S. forces and the game included an assessment of lessons learned in U.S.-British interoperability during similar operations in southern Iraq.

The extremely complex Caspian Sea scenario has become the standard non-Asian platform for education, training and force development in the Army.  The current 2005 "high resolution" version model provides analysts with the ability to manipulate thousands of entities using tens of thousands of combat orders to simulate all aspects of major combat operations. The scenario not only has variable "physical battlespace" including urban terrain, but an adaptive enemy, allowing analysis of not just standard military operations but also complex counter-insurgency activity.

In February 2005, after a similar flurry of news reporting on U.S. military options for Iran, the Deputy Commander of CENTCOM Lt. Gen. Lance Smith was asked at a Pentagon briefing if the Tampa based command was in any kind of heightened state of planning when it comes to Iran.

"We plan everything," Smith responded. "We have a requirement on a regular basis to update plans. We try to keep them current, particularly if -- you know, if our region is active. But I haven't been called into any late-night meetings at, you know, 8:00 at night, saying, 'Holy cow, we got to sit down and go plan for Iran.'"

Throughout mid-2002, when a similar public debate about an Iraq war plan swirled in the news, Secretary Rumsfeld, Myers, and then CENTCOM commander Gen. Tommy Franks insisted that there were no "war plans," that they hadn't been asked to prepare a war plan, that no decisions had been made, that no war plan sat on the President's desk.

It would take a doctoral dissertation to wade through the chronology of statements and actions to sort out the specifics of the truth, but here is the reality: Iraq war planning consumed the government inner circle all through this period and the government made a knee jerk decision -- never really thoughtfully reviewed -- not to speak about it. "We don't discuss war plans," the mantra goes. And it is dead wrong.

Maybe history will show that the Bush administration was so hell bent on war in 2002-2003, nothing that Saddam Hussein could have done would have prevented it. Still the world went through the motions of U.N. inspections and the Security Council and the U.S. Congress made decisions based upon the allusion that war could still be averted, that all diplomatic options would be exhausted before the decision to go to war was made.

We now also know that the Iraqis themselves didn't quite believe that the United States was serious about regime change and that it would go all the way. Perhaps though, had the United States candidly stated its intentions rather than spending so much time denying reality, Baghdad would have gotten the message and war would have been averted, perhaps in another time and place.

It seems today we face a similar problem with Iran. The President of the United States insists that all options are on the table while the Secretary of Defense insists it "isn't useful" to discuss American options.

I think this sends the wrong message to Tehran. Contingency planning for a full fledged war with Iran may seem incredible right now, and Iran isn't Iraq. But Iran needs to understand that the United States isn't hamstrung by a lack of options, Iran needs to know that it can't just stonewall and evade international inspections, that it can't burrow further underground in hopes of "winning" because war is messy.

As I've said before in these pages, I don't believe that the United States is planning to imminently attack Iran, and I specifically don't think so because Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons and it hasn't lashed out militarily against anyone.

But the United States military is really, really getting ready, building war plans and options, studying maps, shifting its thinking.

It is not in our interests to have Tehran not understand this. The military options currently on the table might not be good ones, but Iran shouldn't make decisions based upon a false view. Two so-called "experts" are quoted in The Washington Post today saying that there are no options, that there is no Plan B, that the United States will just live with Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. They are fundamentally wrong about the options, and misunderstand the Bush administration as well.

But most important, this constant drum beat in the newspapers and the media sends the wrong message to Iran. This is why Secretary Rumsfeld should be saying that the U.S. is preparing war plans for Iran, and that the United States views the situation so seriously that it would be willing to risk war if Iran acquired nuclear weapons or lashed out against the U.S. or its friends. The war planning moreover, Rumsfeld needs to add, is not just routine, it is not just what military's do all the time. It is specifically related to Iran, to its illegal pursuit of nuclear weapons, to its meddling in Iraq and support for international terrorism.

Iran needs to know the facts and the American public need to know the facts. But most important, the American public needs to hear the facts about American war plans, military options and preparedness from the government so that they can understand where we are and decide whether they think the threat from Iran justifies the risks of another war.

Iran rebuffs UN nuclear chief in talks

President asserts right to continue uranium process

TEHRAN -- Iran rebuffed a request by the UN nuclear agency chief yesterday that it suspend uranium enrichment, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad insisted his country will not retreat ''one iota."

The chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, looked much less optimistic after the four hours of talks with Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, than he had when he arrived for the one-day visit and said the time was ''ripe" for a political solution to the standoff.

ElBaradei, who is hoping to prevent a confrontation between Tehran and the Security Council, put forward the UN request for Iran to suspend enrichment until questions over its nuclear program are resolved.

But Larijani indicated suspension was not an option. ''Such proposals are not very important ones," he told reporters matter-of-factly while standing next to ElBaradei at a joint news conference after the talks.

Hours earlier, Ahmadinejad said enrichment was a line in the sand from which the Iranians would not retreat. ''We won't hold talks with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation (to enrich uranium), and no one has the right to retreat, even one iota," the president was quoted as saying by Islamic Republic News Agency.

''Our answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: 'Be angry at us and die of this anger,' " Ahmadinejad said.

Iran says its nuclear work is solely for peaceful, civilian purposes, but the United States and several allies believe it seeks a nuclear arsenal.

ElBaradei said the extent of the nuclear program was uncertain: ''We have not seen diversion of nuclear material for weapons purposes, but the picture is still hazy."

During the 20 years of Iran's nuclear program, ''lots of activities went unreported," ElBaradei said.

Higher-level enrichment makes uranium suitable for a nuclear bomb, although Western experts familiar with Iran's program say the country is far from producing weapons-grade uranium.

ElBaradei said that in their talks, Larijani had renewed Iran's commitment ''to provide clarity to outstanding issues before I write my report to the (International Atomic Energy Agency) board by the end of this month."

The Security Council has given Iran until April 28 to cease enrichment of uranium. But Iran has rejected the demand. It said Tuesday that, for the first time, it had enriched uranium with 164 centrifuges -- a step toward large-scale production.

Representatives of the five permanent Security Council members -- the United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia -- discussed the latest development yesterday morning. The United States and Europe are pressing for sanctions, a step Russia and China have so far opposed.

''We want to see what the outcome of the discussions between ElBaradei and the Iranian government is. And when we get information on that, we'll consider what to do next," US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton said after the meeting.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said there will ''have to be some consequence" for Iran's refusal to suspend uranium enrichment activities.

''There is no doubt that Iran continues to defy the will of the international community despite the fact that the international community very clearly said stop," Rice said.

Undersecretary for Arms Control Robert Joseph rejected Iran's claims that its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes.

''If it had nuclear weapons, I am sure (Iran) would be even more ambitious in its use of terror to undercut the prospects of peace in the Middle East," Joseph told reporters in Cairo.

China said yesterday it was sending its assistant foreign minister to Tehran to convey its concerns about the nuclear program.

Russia to Host New Round of Talks on Iran

The Associated Press
Friday, April 14, 2006

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006041400202.html

MOSCOW -- Russia will host another round of talks next week with the United States, the European Union and China on Iran's nuclear program, the Foreign Ministry said Friday.

The talks will be held in Moscow on Tuesday, said Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Krivtsov.

China said Thursday that Cui Tiankai, assistant to Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, would visit Iran and Russia on April 14-18. Russia and China, which have strong economic ties with Iran, have opposed the U.S. push for international sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program.

U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns will also be in Moscow on Monday for a meeting of political directors of the Group of Eight, the U.S. Embassy said.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, visited Tehran on Thursday and pushed Iranian officials to suspend uranium enrichment until questions over Tehran's nuclear program have been resolved. But Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran will not retreat "one iota" on its uranium enrichment.

Iran insists on its right to enrich uranium as part of a civilian power generation program, but the United States and others accuse Tehran of covertly pursuing a nuclear weapons bid and demand a halt to all enrichment activities.

Iran Rafsanjani meets radical Palestinian leaders

 

http://www.iranmania.com/News/ArticleView/Default.asp?NewsCode=41994&NewsKind=Current%20Affairs

LONDON, April 14 (IranMania) - Iran's influential former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani met with leaders of the radical Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad as well as the head of the Shiite Lebanese Hezbollah movement, Iranian sources said, according to AFP.

Rafsanjani is on a four-day visit to the Syrian capital amid worldwide alarm over Iran's announcement Tuesday that it had successfully enriched uranium, a process that can lead to the production of fuel for nuclear power plants or the fissile core of an atomic bomb.

"The Palestinian resistance has today reached a new phase which requires the support of all Muslim countries... to reach victory," Rafsanjani said, according to an Iranian source who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Rafsanjani met Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah late Wednesday at the Iranian embassy in Damascus, the source said.

Nasrallah said that Iran's ability to enrich uranium would "be a large moral boost to the resistance."

An Iranian diplomatic source also said that on Wednesday night Rafsanjani met Hamas's political supremo Khaled Meshaal and Islamic Jihad's secretary-general Ramadan Shaleh, AFP noted.

"The Muslim world is proud that Tehran has acquired nuclear technology," Meshaal reportedly said during their meeting.

"Uranium enrichment provides a great deal of moral support to the Palestinian people and heroes of the resistance," he said.

Rafsanjani assured that Iran would continue its support for the Palestinian resistance and criticized "Western states that have suspended aid the Palestinian Authority."

Rafsanjani also met with Syrian Prime Minister Naji Otri and Foreign Minister Walid Muallem over "external pressures confronting Syria and Iran," the official SANA news agency said.

On Wednesday, Rafsanjani vowed Tehran would not give in to UN pressures to halt its enrichment of uranium, which he hailed as a great achievement.

Tehran's announcement put Iran on a collision course with the UN Security Council, which has given the country until April 28 to accede to demands that it halt enrichment or face possible sanctions.

Iran insists that its nuclear program is aimed purely at producing nuclear power, but the country is widely suspected of using it to conceal efforts to develop atomic weapons.

Asked about international pressures on Syria over issues ranging from its alleged interference in neighboring Lebanon to alleged support for Iraqi rebels, Rafsanjani said Wednesday: "Iran and Syria are in the same boat."

Rafsanjani, who heads Iran's powerful Expediency Council, is slated to hold talks with President Bashar al-Assad at some point during his visit.

On Friday, Rafsanjani is to visit the tomb in Qarhaba of the president's father and predecessor in office, Hafez al-Assad. The following day, he is set to visit Shiite Muslim holy sites in Damascus before heading home.

Will America avoid a war with Iran?

13/04/2006 15:25

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20060413/46040998.html

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Poytr Goncharov.) - Tehran has announced that it will assemble 3,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges by the end of the Iranian year, which is March 21, 2007.

This is not the first exchange of "pre-emptive strikes" between Washington and Tehran, which fuels the thought that a war between them is unavoidable. Washington responded to the large-scale naval exercises in the Persian Gulf, which demonstrated Iran's readiness to protect its nuclear program from a potential aggression, with an article by Seymour Hersh, a regular contributor to The New Yorker on military and security matters.

Revelations by that journalist, who is known to have connections in the U.S. Administration, about a potential air attack at about 400 targets in Iran are most probably based on insider information. But they did not embarrass Tehran, even though Hersh writes about possible use of tactical nuclear weapons. Analysts mentioned the same number of targets when writing that Iran might attack 400 targets in Israel if the U.S. drives it into a corner.

The possible use of tactical weapons should not have come as a surprise to Tehran either, because the National Security Strategy made public by Washington on March 16 reaffirmed its intention to use such weapons in preventive strikes.

Tehran responded to Hersh's article by saying that Iranian scientists had enriched uranium to 3.5% and 3,000 enrichment centrifuges would be assembled soon.

"Iran will soon join the international club of states that have nuclear technology," President Ahmadinejad has said. The U.S. Administration blanched at this statement as one more example of the Iranian regime's neglect for the international community.

How long will the sides keep exchanging these "pinpoint strikes" and what will be the end? The U.S.-initiated escalation of tensions over Iran's nuclear program is gathering momentum. In early March, the United States rejected the idea of a meeting of the European Trio and China to draft a new strategy on the Iranian nuclear problem. In one of his interviews, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns mentioned the creation of an anti-Iranian coalition. The new National Security Strategy labeled Iran the main enemy of the U.S. And in mid-March, the U.S. started amassing troops on the border with Iran and announced - but has not started - Operation Swarmer aimed at clearing "a suspected [Iraqi] insurgent operating area."

Meanwhile, Iran refused to comply with the request of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would allow the IAEA to make surprise inspections of its nuclear facilities. Tehran also does not agree to stop its uranium enrichment projects. It looks as if it wants to fuel tensions over the nuclear dossier no less than Washington; its latest statement on uranium enrichment has forced the problem into a dead-end.

Tehran probably thinks that the U.S. would never start a military operation against it, because it is bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and American public opinion will be categorically against starting one more war. Israel is not likely to participate in a military operation against Iran either, especially in view of growing tensions in the Palestinian territories. And lastly, experts say that Iran is much stronger than Iraq, and Washington should take this into account.

All, or nearly all, of this is true. But the U.S. is not doing as badly in Afghanistan as in Iraq, and hence the possibility of another military operation waged simultaneously with actions in Afghanistan cannot be ruled out. And Washington certainly knows that Iran is not Iraq, which is why the potential Iranian operation will not be a carbon copy of the Iraqi war.

As to Israel and the Palestinian problem, the United States will hardly look benignly at Iran's intention to acquire the status of the regional superpower, which Tehran has recently proclaimed as its goal. Washington regards Iran's uncompromising stand on the creation of a full nuclear cycle as a wish to create the bomb, though Iran claims that it is creating the infrastructure for a peaceful nuclear program.

According to Washington, there are more than enough reasons to doubt Iran's sincerity. Indeed, why should Iran need a full nuclear cycle if producing nuclear fuel is nearly four times more expensive than buying it?

Will the U.S. decide against a military operation to suit Iran's ambitions? Difficult to say, because it is America's interests in the region that are at stake.

UN Security Council's sanctions against Iran are another factor. Israel, which is America's strategic ally in the region, suggested imposing increasingly harsh sanctions on Iran. Therefore, Washington probably regards a military operation against Iran as the last resort to be taken if the UN does not approve sanctions. In short, nobody can say now if the U.S. will avoid a war with Iran.

Target: Iran


Yes, there is a feasible military option against the mullahs' nuclear program.
by Thomas McInerney
04/24/2006, Volume 011, Issue 30

 

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/101dorxa.asp

A MILITARY OPTION AGAINST Iran's nuclear facilities is feasible. A diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis is preferable, but without a credible military option and the will to implement it, diplomacy will not succeed. The announcement of uranium enrichment last week by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad shows Iran will not bow easily to diplomatic pressure. The existence of a military option may be the only means of persuading Iran--the world's leading sponsor of terrorism--to back down from producing nuclear weapons.

A military option would be all the more credible if backed by a new coalition of the willing and if coupled with intense diplomacy during a specific time frame. The coalition could include Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey, Britain, France, and Germany. Solidarity is important and would surely contribute to potential diplomatic success. But should others decline the invitation, the United States must be prepared to act.

What would an effective military response look like? It would consist of a powerful air campaign led by 60 stealth aircraft (B-2s, F-117s, F-22s) and more than 400 nonstealth strike aircraft, including B-52s, B-1s, F-15s, F-16s, Tornados, and F-18s. Roughly 150 refueling tankers and other support aircraft would be deployed, along with 100 unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and 500 cruise missiles. In other words, overwhelming force would be used.

The objective would be, first and foremost, to destroy or severely damage Iran's nuclear development and production facilities and put them out of commission for at least five years. Another aim would

 

be to destroy the Iranian air defense system, significantly damage its air force, naval forces, and Shahab-3 offensive missile forces. This would prevent Iran from projecting force outside the country and retaliating militarily. The air campaign would also wipe out or neutralize Iran's command and control capabilities.

This coalition air campaign would hit more than 1,500 aim points. Among the weapons would be the new 28,000-pound bunker busters, 5,000-pound bunker penetrators, 2,000-pound bunker busters, 1,000-pound general purpose bombs, and 500-pound GP bombs. A B-2 bomber, to give one example, can drop 80 of these 500-pound bombs independently targeted at 80 different aim points.

This force would give the coalition an enormous destructive capability, since all the bombs in the campaign feature precision guidance, ranging from Joint Direct Attack Munitions (the so-called JDAMS) to laser-guided, electro-optical, or electronically guided High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) for suppression of Iranian surface-to-air missiles. This array of precision weapons and support aircraft would allow the initial attacks to be completed in 36 to 48 hours.

The destruction of Iran's military force structure would create the opportunity for regime change as well, since it would eliminate some or all of Ahmadinejad's and the mullahs' ability to control the population. Simultaneously or prior to the attack, a major covert operation could be launched, utilizing Iranian exiles and dissident forces trained during the period of diplomacy. This effort would be based on the Afghan model that led to the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Not only would the overt and covert attacks weaken the ability of Iran's leaders to carry out offensive operations in retaliation, they would cripple the leaders' power to control their own people.

Iran's diverse population should be fertile ground for a covert operation. Iran is only 51 percent Persian. Azerbaijanis and Kurds comprise nearly 35 percent of the population. Seventy percent are under 30, and the jobless rate hovers near 20 percent.

Iran's leaders have threatened to unleash a firestorm of terrorism in the event military action is taken against them. Any country involved in the attack would be subject to retaliation by Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and al Qaeda, the Iranians have claimed. If nothing else, this threat demonstrates how closely tied Iran is to terrorist groups. The United States and its allies would have to be prepared for stepped-up terrorist acts. Iran could also project forces into Iraq, but this is unlikely because they would encounter the full strength of the American military. However, Iran might encourage proxies among Iraq's militant Shiites. Coalition forces in Iraq would have to be ready to respond.

No doubt the Iranians would attempt to close the Gulf of Hormuz and block the extensive shipping that goes through it. American air and naval forces are quite capable of keeping the gulf open, though shipping might be slowed. The most adverse economic consequences of shipping delays would be felt in Iran itself.

President Bush is right when he says Iran cannot be permitted to have nuclear weapons. The prospect of leaders like Ahmadinejad, who advocates wiping Israel "off the map," with their hands on nuclear weapons is a risk we cannot take. Diplomacy must be pursued vigorously, but the experience with

 

Iraq suggests there's little reason for optimism. Thus, a viable military option is imperative.

Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney (Ret.) served as assistant vice chief of staff of the United States Air Force.

'Big George': The Coming Attack on Iran

 

Kenneth R. Timmerman, NewsMax.com
Friday, April 14, 2006

http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/4/13/94944.shtml?s=sp

WASHINGTON -- Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Tom McInerney calls it the "Big George" scenario.

According to the man who helped plan the first air war against Saddam in 1991, U.S. aircraft, armed with conventional bunker-buster bombs, would be more than enough to wipe out Iran's nuclear and missile facilities, and cripple its ability to command and control its military forces.

McInerney believes that U.S. air power is so massive, precise, and stealthy, it can effectively disarm Iran with just limited assistance from covert operators on the ground whose task would be to light up enemy targets.

In his "Big George" scenario, the United States would attack 1,000 targets in Iran. Fifteen B2 stealth bombers based in the United States and another 45 F117s and F-22s based in the region would carry out the initial waves of the attack, crippling Iran's long-range radar and strategic air defenses.

Massive, additional waves of carrier-based F-18s, as well as F-15s and F-16s launching from ground bases in Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, and Bahrain, would take out Iran's known nuclear and missile sites.

"Big George" would also target command and control facilities – Revolutionary Guards command centers, key clerics, and other regime-sensitive sites – in the hope of triggering a revolt against the clerical regime by opposition groups inside Iran.

The massive strike scenario could be carried out in just two days, McInerney told an audience of intelligence specialists recently in Washington. "We must destroy and damage Iran's nuclear capability for at least five years," McInerney said.

If the president decided to focus solely on Iran's nuclear and missile sites, McInerney proposed a Plan B version he called "Big Rummy."

"Big Rummy" would be executed in a single night, and would concentrate on 500 "aim points." It would require greater assistance from covert operators if the administration's goal was to provoke regime collapse, McInerney added. But in a report appearing in the New Yorker, left-wing columnist Seymour Hersh claims that President Bush is so filled with doubt over the Pentagon's conventional capabilities that he asked military planners to consider using nuclear weapons against Iran.

Hersh claimed that his sources in the defense and intelligence establishment suggested the military could use the B61-11 warhead. But Hersh's scenario, based on old technology, packs more political shock value than actual military punch.

The first B61 warhead, now designated B61-1, entered the U.S. strategic stockpile in 1968, according to the Department of Energy.

A reconfigured B61, designated B61-7, was the first U.S. strategic nuclear weapon to be equipped with a "hardened ground-penetrator nose." It was introduced into the stockpile in 1985 and had a selectable yield of 10 to about 340 kilotons, according to a report by the anti-nuclear Los Alamos Study Group. The report can be viewed at www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/lasg.htm.

The 1990s upgrade, B61-11, can be "dialed down" to even smaller nuclear yields, reportedly to just 0.3 kilotons.

All the B61 family of warheads are gravity bombs using delayed fuzes to allow the attacking aircraft to escape. But it remains unclear how successful such weapons would be at reaching hardened nuclear sites buried deep inside mountains, where some of Iran's clandestine facilities are believed to be.

U.S. military planners have long wanted to develop a new generation of low yield, nuclear earth penetrators, to hit hardened nuclear sites. In their arguments to Congress in favor of such weapons, they have cited the necessity of eliminating facilities buried deep in the mountains of North Korea.

However, arms control advocates have argued successfully that such weapons would constitute an unwarranted threat to non-nuclear countries. Last year the United States Senate refused yet again to authorize funds to develop a new generation of nuclear bunker buster bombs by one vote.

The alleged White House request to include nuclear weapons in strike plans against Iran upset the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hersh writes.

Citing a former senior intelligence officer, Hersh claims that top commanders "have talked about resigning," because their efforts to remove the nuclear option from the evolving war plans for Iran have fallen on deaf ears.

Hersh has frequently quoted former DIA analyst Colonel Patrick Laing and like-minded former officials who have vigorously denounced the Bush administration over the war in Iraq.

Their claims have been dismissed by current military and intelligence officials who argue that they are politically motivated.

In one such story in 2003, Hersh alleged the Pentagon had a "secret" Iraq war planning outfit that was carrying out rogue intelligence operations, when in fact the Office of Special Plans was an analytical unit that was part of the Pentagon's policy shop.

Former President George H.W. Bush ordered the U.S. military to repatriate all remaining U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed overseas in 1991.

The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons overseas would require the approval of host governments, thus increasing the likelihood that news of the deployment would leak.

The only country that has threatened to use nuclear weapons against a terrorist state is France.

On Jan. 19, French President Jacques Chirac announced publicly that he had ordered the French military to utilize French nuclear weapons to hit targets in countries that threaten to use weapons of mass destruction in a terrorist attack.

His speech was widely interpreted in France to mean that the weapons had been retargeted against Iran.

Iran's Response

For its part, Iran is unlikely to sit still should the United States or its NATO allies make active preparations for a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.

Iran tested its war plans last week, mobilizing tens of thousands of troops, and hundreds of small boats, missile boats, aircraft and new missiles in the Persian Gulf.

Revolutionary Guards Air Force Cmdr. General Hossein Salami reconfirmed in an April 4 Iranian TV interview (www.memritv.org/search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=1106) that Iran had the capability to block the Strait of Hormuz, where 20 percent of the world's oil supplies transit daily. [Editor's Note: NewsMax first revealed Iran's first-strike plans in February, after obtaining copies of the classified war plans from a former Iranian intelligence officer: Iran Readies Plan to Close Strait of Hormuz]

"Iran controls over 2,000 km of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Even without this [latest] maneuver Iran has this ability. This is a natural ability of our country. Iran can block oil export whenever necessary," he said.

Iran also announced that it had tested a series of new missiles, including a Shahab-3 variant with multiple warheads. The United States believes Iran redesigned the Shahab-3 in 2004 to carry a nuclear warhead. The missile has sufficient range to reach Israel.

A further redesign to carry multiple warheads could only mean one thing, former White House counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke, told ABC News: "Iran is claiming that missile has multiple warheads," he said. "The only reason for having multiple warheads is if you have nuclear weapons."

NewsMax first revealed Iran's first-strike plans in February, after obtaining copies of the classified war plans from a former Iranian intelligence officer.

The plans instructed Iranian forces to use chemical, biological, and radiological weapons to repulse a U.S.-led ground offensive in the Strait of Hormuz.

They also called on Iran's Revolutionary Guards Navy to launch hundreds of explosives-laden speedboats in swarming suicide attacks against U.S. warships.

Iran will use Chinese and Russian-made bottom-tethered mines to block the Strait of Hormuz, and to bottle up U.S. and foreign warships already present inside the Persian Gulf.

The EM-53 bottom-tethered mines Iran purchased from China in the 1990s uses a rocket-propelled charge that can hit the hull of its target at speeds in excess of 70 miles per hour. Some analysts believe it can knock out a U.S. aircraft carrier.

United Against Iran

The United States currently has a carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf, led by the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76).

The battle group includes Aegis-class cruisers and destroyers capable of launching cruise missiles, anti-submarine and anti-mine warfare vessels, nuclear submarines, and some 70 attack and support aircraft.

And the United States is not alone in handling maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. More than a half-dozen other nations participating in three international task forces are helping to keep tabs on the area and on Iran.

Combined Task Force 58 patrols the northern Persian Gulf area near Basra, Iraq, with the specific mission of protecting Iraqi oil export terminals, according to U.S. Navy Web sites. It is made up of forces from Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Iraq, and is led by a Royal Navy officer.

Combined Task Force 152 is an exclusively American force, and patrols the central and southern Persian Gulf, including the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Fifth Fleet, which contributes forces to Operation Enduring Freedom in Iraq, is headquartered in Bahrain.

Combined Task Force 150 is based outside the Gulf and patrols the Gulf of Oman, the North Arabian Sea, parts of the Indian Ocean, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. It includes ships from France, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, as well as Pakistan.

Altogether, the three international task forces include on average 45 ships and 20,000 personnel from various nations, according to the U.S. Navy.

Of course, all of this news doesn't bode well for oil prices. Reacting to escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf, oil was trading for May delivery on the New York Mercantile Exchange at just under $69 per barrel yesterday.

Nuclear Hostage Crisis

April 14, 2006
The Wall Street Journal
Michael Rubin

link to original article

On April 11, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced, "Iran has joined the club of nuclear countries." State television broadcast the audience chanting "God is great." The presence of senior military commanders underlined the nature of the program, which the regime vowed to continue. Mohammad Saeedi, deputy chairman of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, told state-run television that the Islamic Republic would begin uranium enrichment on an industrial scale but Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi suggested a new status quo. "The West can do nothing and is obliged to extend to us the hand of friendship," he said.

Some diplomats are inclined to take the bait. Kofi Annan urged "everyone to work more actively in search of a diplomatic solution." Earlier this month, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier urged the U.S. to engage Iran directly. On April 11, Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass said that if he were still the State Department's policy planning director, a position he held between 2001 and 2003, he "would put together a diplomatic package." International Atomic Energy Agency director-general Mohamed ElBaradei continues to push the idea. The idea of a Grand Bargain -- diplomatic recognition, security guarantees, and economic incentives in exchange for Iranian forfeiture of its nuclear autonomy -- has had long resonance in the foreign policy debate, even though a similar strategy failed to halt North Korea's program.

Proposals for direct negotiations may be attractive, but they ignore Iranian history. Implicit in any deal is recognition of a system of government which, according to recent surveys, enjoys at most 20% popular support. The Islamic Republic's greatest fear is demography; 70% of Iranians came of age after the Islamic Revolution. They are proud and nationalistic, yet outward looking. They represent Iran's future and have no love for their leadership. The White House should not squander their goodwill. In 1953 and 1979, Washington supported an unpopular regime against the will of the Iranian people; any deal which would preserve the regime would be to make the same mistake again.

When it comes to the Islamic Republic, diplomatic outreach aggravates rather than ameliorates tension. Some realists argue that Washington should appeal to Iranian pragmatists. A 2004 Council on Foreign Relations task force labeled Expediency Council chairman and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani one such pragmatist, but he is the father of the Islamic Republic's covert nuclear program; his pragmatism extends only to questions of personal -- not uranium -- enrichment.

Factionalism matters. But history suggests that rather than provide space for diplomacy, Iran's factional struggles aggravate it. However well-meaning, Western outreach empowers hard-liners and undercuts U.S. interests.

On April 1, 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini declared the Islamic Republic, mutual antipathy was not assured. On Nov. 1, 1979, U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Iran's Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan met in Algiers to discuss resumption of relations. In order to scuttle rapprochement and embarrass moderates, hard-line students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, holding 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. Khomeini used the subsequent crisis to consolidate hard-liner control.

Seven years later, a misguided U.S. attempt to engage Iran sparked the worst Washington scandal since Watergate. In March 1986, U.S. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane traveled secretly to Tehran to spearhead rapprochement as part of a scheme to divert proceeds from arms sales to the Nicaraguan resistance. Within days, pamphlets appeared on Tehran University bulletin boards condemning "the visit of an American official." On Nov. 3, 1986, Ash Shiraa, a pro-Syrian Lebanese magazine, detailed the secret contacts. While the scandal paralyzed Ronald Reagan's second term, the leaks originated not in Washington but in Tehran. The betrayal of Reagan's confidence had nothing to do with the U.S., but rather with an internal Iranian power struggle.

The Clinton administration took its own misstep toward reconciliation when, on Sept. 15, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright arranged to meet alone with her Iranian counterpart on the sidelines of a U.N. Afghanistan conference. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi stood her up. Slights also matter. What Washington shrugged off as a minor embarrassment projected U.S. weakness to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's inner circle.

Nor has engagement only backfired with Washington. Berlin spearheaded engagement with Tehran in 1992, but suspended it five years later after a German court found top Iranian officials, including Messrs. Khamenei and Rafsanjani, complicit in ordering the murder of dissidents in Berlin. But Brussels renewed engagement with vigor two years later after Iranian President Muhammad Khatami called for a "Dialogue of Civilizations." Between 2000 and 2005, European Union trade with Iran almost tripled. The regime invested the hard currency not in civil society but in its weapons program. Speaking softly while wielding a big carrot backfires.

It is comforting but dangerous and naive to believe a magic formula of incentives and guarantees can defuse the Iranian nuclear crisis. The cost of diplomacy alone is high. The Islamic Republic did not construct its centrifuge cascade overnight. Mr. Ahmadinejad may want glory, but the credit for Iran's nuclear enrichment lies with his reformist and pragmatist predecessors. That Iran is now enriching uranium is a testament to years of diplomatic insincerity.

There is little to negotiate. Either Iran agrees to open its sites -- both declared and undeclared -- to unfettered inspection, or it does not. Either Tehran details its dealings with Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, or it does not. While the National Intelligence Estimate says Iran is five to 10 years away from building a bomb, this assumption rests on an entirely domestic program. If Iran purchases weapons-grade material from outside suppliers, all bets are off. North Korea, partner in Washington's last Grand Bargain, would be happy to sell.

The cost of any military strike on Iran would be high, although not as high as the cost of the Islamic Republic gaining nuclear weapons. The Bush administration is paying the price for more than five years without a cogent, coordinated Iran policy. Each passing day limits policy options. Engaging the regime will preserve the problem, not eliminate it. Only when the regime is accountable to the Iranian people can there be a peaceful solution. To do this requires targeted sanctions -- freezing assets and travel bans -- on regimes officials, coupled with augmented and expedited investment in independent rather than government-licensed civil society, labor unions and media. It may be too late, but it would be irresponsible not to try.

Mr. Rubin, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is co-author, with Patrick Clawson, of "Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos" (Palgrave, 2005).

Iran Rejects U.N. Request to Halt Its Nuclear Activity

April 14, 2006
The Associated Press
The Los Angeles Times

link to original article

TEHRAN -- Iran rebuffed a request from U.N. nuclear agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei on Thursday that it suspend uranium enrichment, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad insisted that his country would not retreat "one iota." ElBaradei looked much less optimistic after four hours of talks with Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, than he had when he arrived for the one-day visit.

ElBaradei, who is hoping to head off a confrontation between Tehran and the Security Council, put forward the U.N. request for Iran to suspend enrichment until questions over its nuclear program are resolved.

But Larijani indicated that suspension was not an option. "Such proposals are not very important ones," he told reporters while standing next to ElBaradei at a joint news conference after the talks.

Hours earlier, Ahmadinejad said Iranians would not retreat from enrichment.

"We won't hold talks with anyone about the right of the Iranian nation [to enrich uranium], and no one has the right to retreat, even one iota," Ahmadinejad was quoted as saying by the official Islamic Republic News Agency.

"Our answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear fuel cycle is just one phrase. We say: 'Be angry at us and die of this anger,' " Ahmadinejad said.

Iran says its nuclear work is solely for peaceful, civilian purposes, but the U.S. and a number of its allies believe that Tehran wants a nuclear arsenal.

ElBaradei said the extent of Iran's nuclear program was uncertain. "We have not seen diversion of nuclear material for weapons purposes, but the picture is still hazy and not very clear," he said.

During the 20 years of Iran's nuclear program, "lots of activities went unreported," ElBaradei said.

Higher-level enrichment makes uranium suitable for a nuclear bomb, although Western experts familiar with Iran's program say the country is far from producing weapons-grade uranium.

ElBaradei said that in their talks, Larijani had renewed Iran's commitment "to provide clarity to outstanding issues before I write my report" to the International Atomic Energy Agency board.

The Security Council has given Iran until April 28 to cease enrichment of uranium. But Iran has rejected the demand and announced Tuesday that, for the first time, it had enriched uranium with 164 centrifuges — a step toward large-scale production.

Representatives of the five permanent Security Council members — the U.S., Britain, France, China and Russia — discussed the latest development Thursday morning. The U.S. and Europe are pressing for sanctions, a step that Russia and China have so far opposed.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said there would "have to be some consequence" for Iran's refusal to suspend uranium enrichment activities.

Heard the One About the President?

April 14, 2006
The Guardian
Robert Tait in Tehran

link to original article

The misdirected email or text message is a hazard of our age. It can sour relationships and upset the closest of our friends. But now a stray electronic missive has been blamed for a spate of arrests, a national scandal and a very grumpy president of Iran. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic nation's firebrand leader, has taken umbrage at an unwelcome text received on his mobile phone. According to whispered accounts in the Iranian capital, his ire was stirred when someone sent him a joke suggesting he didn't wash regularly enough.

Although officials claim he possesses a lively sense of humour that belies his rather hairshirt image, on this occasion it suffered a serious failure. Realising the joke was doing the rounds of Iranian mobile phones, the notoriously temperamental president lodged an official complaint with Iran's judiciary department.

That in turn has acted as a pretext for an official purge of the SMS system in the country. Mr Ahmadinejad has since told his staff to pay close attention to all jokes circulating about him by text.

An anti-regime website called Rooz Online claims that under the crackdown the head of the country's mobile phone company has been sacked and four people arrested and accused of colluding with the Israeli foreign intelligence service, Mossad.

But poking fun at the president has becoming a national pastime in Iran. In a fusillade of seditious traffic, the regime's senior figures and its most sacred policies are all fair game - with Mr Ahmadinejad a particular target.

One joke tells of a man who has died and gone to hell, where he sees the famously strait-laced Mr Ahmadinejad dancing with the Hollywood star Jennifer Lopez. "Is this Ahmadinejad's punishment?" he asks.

"No," goes the reply. "It is Jennifer Lopez's punishment."

Another recent joke poked fun at Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, listing characteristics he supposedly inherited from five prophets: Muhammad, Moses, Jesus, Noah and Solomon. Insulting the supreme leader - or the prophets - is a jailing offence in devoutly religious Iran.

Others concentrate heavily on sex, another taboo with Iran's religious hierarchy. One purports to reveal official statistics of what men do after sex: "2% eat; 3% smoke; 4% take a shower; 5% go to sleep: 86% get up and go home to their wives."

The previous assumption was that this exchange of bawdy jibes and political satire could be made without detection. But now senior police officers have announced that they are acutely aware of it and say jokes intercepted could be treated as criminal behaviour.

Particular attention is being paid to jokes comparing Iran's nuclear programme with sex. Several people are widely believed to have received court summonses for sending nuclear-related jokes.

"While the outcome of the recent arrests in connection with SMS messaging is not clear yet, what is certain is that SMS jokes have already put some people into serious trouble," wrote the website Rooz Online.

The clampdown is in line with the authorities' uncompromising stance on the internet and bloggers. Wary of modern communications as a means of spreading political dissent, Iran is second only to China in the number of websites it filters - using technology made in America.

Large numbers of the nation's estimated 70,000 to 100,000 bloggers have faced harassment or imprisonment. The regime has acknowledged monitoring text message traffic. It first admitted it had access to text traffic last December when a military plane carrying more than 100 journalists crashed shortly after take-off at Tehran airport.

The communications minister said text messages were kept by the government for six months and that messages sent by those on board in the moments before the crash could be used to investigate its causes.

The first arrests over text messaging were made in the run-up to last year's presidential election when several anti-regime student leaders were detained for urging a boycott of the poll after the regime had declared voting to be an Islamic duty. "I was arrested for one evening and they made it clear they knew every SMS I had sent and received," said Muhammad Hashemi, leader of the Tahkim Vahdat student movement.

China Steps Into Iran Nuclear Row

April 14, 2006
ITN
itn.co.uk

link to original article

China has insisted that diplomacy is the key to resolving Iran's stand-off with the West as the US issues fresh warnings. The comments came as Condoleezza Rice said the Iranian regime was isolating itself from the international community and had done nothing to show they would follow guidelines regarding their atomic programme.

Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, briefing reporters on President Hu Jintao's visit to the US next week, said all international issues of common concern would be discussed.

He said: "We hope all parties will adopt a cool-headed approach. Dialogue is better than confrontation. We should work together toward this end."

Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Iran had told him it would step up efforts to answer questions on its nuclear plans.

Tehran meanwhile rejected calls to halt work the West says is designed to make weapons. ElBaradei is due to report to the UN Security Council at the end of April.

Meanwhile, North Korea has said it might boost its nuclear deterrent if China-hosted six-country talks on ending its atomic programmes.

If All Else Fails, Limit Iran's Gas Imports

April 14, 2006
Newsday
Rep. Steve Israel

link to original article

The world was buffeted this week by reports that Iran had enriched uranium, while the Pentagon was developing military plans to respond. I have watched this crisis from two vantage points. First, from my seat on the House Armed Services Committee, where I agree with officials that Iran simply cannot continue any program that leads to nuclear weapons. Second, from a seat I recently occupied at a private lunch with Rep. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Javad Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations.

We ate in a dining room decorated, incongruously, with artwork by the Jewish artist Marc Chagal, whose paintings also hang in the Israeli Knesset.

The food was abundant, but the message was clear: Iran would not end its nuclear program, had no fear of U.S. military action and was unconcerned by its growing isolation in the world.

Are we on a collision course? Is a military strike our only option? The fact is that our response in Iran is like a Rubik's Cube: Every move we make presents seemingly unsolvable complications elsewhere.

Start with Iraq. Any pressure we place on Iran - whether diplomatic, economic or military - will likely result in Tehran's using its considerable influence in Iraq to incite more violence against our troops. A diplomatic or economic solution by the United Nations Security Council? Since 2000, 40 percent of the world's increased demand for oil has come from China alone, and 12 percent of China's oil imports come from Iran. China, of course, has veto power on the UN Security Council.

Some have suggested that we seek an accommodation, perhaps a formal accord promising nonbelligerence. Others have proposed allowing Iran to develop a slow, incremental civilian nuclear research program in exchange for intrusive, verifiable International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

Although we should flesh out the details of these ideas, I am skeptical that adequate safeguards can be developed. I am particularly concerned that a slow and incremental nuclear program in Iran will lead to a slow and incremental nuclear program in Saudi Arabia, then Egypt, then Syria and proliferate throughout the world. Other nonmilitary options - including covert activities to disrupt Iranian centrifuges and boycotts by nuclear suppliers - are similarly problematic.

This leads us to the military options. All we need to do is look at Iraq to understand the difficulties of a military response in Iran. In fact, during an unofficial war game on Iran, one former National Security Council official said, "Compared with Iraq, Iran has three times the population, four times the land area and five times the problems."

Some suggest precision strikes at Iran's nuclear facilities. But Iran has protected its facilities by burying them deep underground and dispersing them widely. There may be hundreds of targets, and if we miss a few important ones, Iran will likely retaliate with 1,200- mile-range missiles.

Additionally, virtually every military tool at our disposal - from limited and surgical to a major land war aimed at regime change - is affected by oil. Iran could blockade the Straits of Hormuz and choke the supply of oil necessary to keep the lights on in the Pentagon and the tanks filled in our fighter jets, and double the price of U.S. fuel.

Still, there is one option to consider before resorting to war. Iran may be a major exporter of oil, but it imports 40 percent of its gasoline because it has a limited refining capacity. And like us, its population is sensitive to the price of gas in an uncertain economy.

If diplomatic, economic and other tools don't work in dissuading the Iranian regime from its nuclear ambitions, reducing the amount of gas that goes into Iran may. Doing so would dramatically increase the cost of gasoline in Iran and put political pressure on the government to rethink its nuclear program and isolation in the world. A global commitment to keeping gas out of Iran is more effective and manageable than keeping oil in.

I believe strongly that the most effective and least risky approach will be sustained diplomatic pressure on Tehran. But if all these tools truly fail, a gas blockade is far better than the options that occupy the extremes: Iran with a nuclear bomb or U.S. combat operations in yet another Mideast country. Our military planners should be considering it carefully. We have learned in Iraq that a military mission that looks easy to accomplish can be exceedingly difficult to maintain.

Rep. Steve Israel (D-Huntington) is a member of the House Armed Services Committee.

Iran Strike 'Any Time'

April 14, 2006
Mirror
Mirror.co.uk

link to original article

An attack on Iran could be launched at any time by the US, a former British ambassador warned yesterday. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UN envoy before the Iraq invasion, said: "Military action is an option from now on."

But he urged the US to use diplomacy before resorting to force. He said: "The use of force in most circumstances is a sign of failure by diplomacy.

"It not only has to be seen as a last resort but as an extremely reluctant last resort." Sir Jeremy also urged America to get UN backing.

Delusion and Denial

April 13, 2006
St. Petersburg Times
A Times Editorial

link to original article

The Bush administration denies that it has plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities, but that country is a bigger threat than Iraq ever was.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says published reports about secret U.S. plans to attack Iran's nuclear facilities are "fantasyland." But whose fantasy? Rumsfeld and President Bush were similarly dismissive of earlier reports, since substantiated, that the president was committed to go to war in Iraq long before he publicly gave up on diplomacy. So the administration's denials about Iran aren't being taken too seriously.

And maybe they aren't intended to be. For make no mistake: Iran's nuclear weapons program, unlike Iraq's, is real and dangerous, and it would be irresponsible of the Bush administration not to prepare for every contingency, including the possibility of pre-emptive military action. Leaks of the Pentagon's plans in the New Yorker and other publications could succeed where diplomatic pressure has so far failed, creating enough fear and doubt to slow the Tehran regime's headlong rush toward nuclear weapons. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's gloating announcement this week of Iran's advance in the enrichment of uranium was a clear repudiation of the U.N. Security Council's toothless warnings.

The specter of a nuclear arsenal controlled by Iran's extremist clerics demands military preparedness. Still, an imminent U.S. military strike in Iran would be an act of almost suicidal recklessness. First, Iran's nuclear facilities are believed to be so scattered and well fortified that even massive air strikes might not eliminate them. Second, Iran's regime is far more powerful than Saddam Hussein ever was. It could retaliate against any attack by destabilizing the world oil market, unleashing Hezbollah and other terrorist groups and fomenting tensions throughout the Islamic world.

Fortunately, Iran is still believed to be a few years away from completing a nuclear weapon. But responding effectively to Iran before time runs out will require the Bush administration to rebuild the internal credibility and international support it has squandered - along with oceans of blood and treasure - in Iraq.

In recent years, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton built strong international alliances to respond to genuine threats in regions of strategic concern. A true coalition of the willing - including broad support from Islamic governments - repelled Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Innovative use of NATO's resources in the Balkans belatedly ended the most systematic campaign of genocide Europe had endured since World War II. Diverting Tehran's nuclear ambitions and bolstering the Iranian people's democratic aspirations will require similar leadership from an administration that has spent the past few years lost in isolated delusions of fantasyland.

After Diplomacy Fails

April 13, 2006
The Washington Post
Mark Helprin

link to original article

Even were one to believe that, despite its low and stagnant per capita gross national product and having the world's second-largest reserves of petroleum and natural gas, Iran would invest uneconomically in nuclear power generation, one would also have to disbelieve that it wanted nuclear weapons. But with an intermediate-range strategic nuclear capacity, it could deter American intervention, reign over the Persian Gulf, further separate Europe from American Middle East policy, correct a nuclear imbalance with Pakistan, lead and perhaps unify the Islamic world, and thus create the chance to end Western dominance of the Middle East and/or with a single shot destroy Israel.

Iran's claim of innocuous nuclear ambitions comports both with the Islamic doctrine of taqqiya (literal truth need not be conveyed to infidels) and the Western doctrine of state secrecy (the same thing), and it is part of a strategy of deception and false compromise deployed to buy time. After almost three years, the Bush administration has maneuvered the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council, where it will fall under the protection of Russia and China, which will make any resolution meaningless or veto it outright. In the event of sanctions, Iran can sell oil to China in exchange for all the manufactures it might need, trade on the black market and eventually reenter the world economy after the inevitable unveiling of Iranian nuclear weapons stimulates the resignation of the West.

Were Russia not playing a double game, it would not have agreed in December to upgrade the Iranian air force and sell Iran 29 SA-15 SAMs for the protection of key facilities. Russia and China can operate in contradiction of what many assume to be their self-interest because they have always had a different appreciation of and doctrine relating to nuclear weapons, because they are willing to live dangerously and because they are the least likely targets. In addition, the agitation that they support roils the smooth surface of the Pax Americana to their maximum opportunity and relief. For example, chaos in the Middle East makes Russia in comparison a stable supplier of energy and shifts European resources and dependency to Russia's advantage.

Other than the likely nothing, what will the United States have done in the months and years ahead to prepare for the failure of diplomacy and sanctions? The obvious option is an aerial campaign to divest Iran of its nuclear potential: i.e., clear the Persian Gulf of Iranian naval forces, scrub anti-ship missiles from the shore and lay open antiaircraft-free corridors to each target. With the furious capacity of its new weapons, the United States can accomplish this readily. Were the targets effectively hidden or buried, Iran could be shut down, coerced and perhaps revolutionized by the simple and rapid destruction of its oil production and transport. The Iranians know their obvious vulnerabilities, but are we aware of ours?

In this war with a newly revived militant Islam, we think systematically and they think imaginatively. As we strain to bring the genius of imagination to our systems, they attempt to bring systematic discipline to their imagination, and neither of us is precluded from success. Despite our superior power, its diminution by geography, overcommittment and politics means that they might confound us. And because they believe absolutely in the miraculous, one must credit their stated aim to defeat us in the short term by hurling our armies from the Middle East and in the long term by causing the collapse of Western civilization.

If, like his predecessors Saladin, the Mahdi of Sudan and Nasser, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad goes for the long shot, he may have in mind to draw out and damage any American onslaught with his thousands of surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft guns; by a concentrated air and naval attack to sink one or more major American warships; and to mobilize the Iraqi Shia in a general uprising, with aid from infiltrated Revolutionary Guard and conventional elements, that would threaten U.S. forces in Iraq and sever their lines of supply. This by itself would be a victory for those who see in the colors of martyrdom, but if he could knock us back and put enough of our blood in the water, the real prize might come into reach. That is: to make such a fury in the Islamic world that, as it has done before and not long ago, it would throw over caution in favor of jihad. As simply as it can be said, were Egypt to close the canal, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to lock up their airspace -- which, with their combined modern air forces, they could -- the U.S. military in Iraq and the Gulf, bereft of adequate supply, would be beleaguered and imperiled.

In trying to push the Iraqi snake by its tail, we have lost sight of the larger strategic picture, of which such events, though very unlikely, may become a part. But because the Iranian drive for deployable nuclear weapons will take years, we have a period of grace. In that time, we would do well to strengthen -- in numbers and mass as well as quality -- the means with which we fight, to reinforce the fleet train with which to supply the fighting lines, and to plan for a land route from the Mediterranean across Israel and Jordan to the Tigris and Euphrates. And even if we cannot extricate ourselves from nation-building and counterinsurgency in Iraq, we must have a plan for remounting the army there so that it can fight and maneuver as it was born to do.

To make these provisions will secure our flanks and give us a freer hand in the potentially difficult project of denying to a rogue nation of 68 million people, with a well-developed military and a penchant for rash action, the nuclear weapons it is bent on acquiring and rushing to construct. Our problem in Iraq has been delusion and lack of foresight. Iran is bigger and more powerful. What a pity it would be either to do nothing or once again to lurch forward with neither strategy nor thought.

The writer, a novelist and journalist, served in the Israeli army and air force. He is a senior fellow of the Claremont Institute. This article will also appear in the Claremont Review of Books.

Rafsanjani in Syria on Talks with US and Terror Groups

April 13, 2006
Arabic News
ArabicNews.com

link to original article

Upcoming talks between Tehran and Washington on Iraq could, if they turn out to be successful, pave the way for talks on other issues, Expediency Council Chairman Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was quoted by Al-Hayat daily today.

Speaking exclusively with the London-based daily, Rafsanjani said that the Iran-US talks would only focus on developments in Iraq.

Al Hayat, on its website Thursday, further quoted Rafsanjani as speculating that "if Iran and US are satisfied with the outcome of their talks this would encourage them to discuss other issues." "New ways will be created to encourage further talks if the two sides reach a successful outcome in their upcoming dialogue," Rafsanjani was quoted in the website as saying.

But he made it clear that Iran's nuclear case would not be in the agenda of the talks.

As for Tehran-Damascus relations, the cleric informed that the "two sides would continue their cooperation on issues related to Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq." He said that further US pressures on Iran and Syria would only draw them closer than ever.

According to Al Hayat, Rafsanjani was of the view that Saudi Arabia could play an "effective role in lessening tensions between Iran and the US." "Given the wisdom of the Saudi king, we are sure that he can help settle issues in the entire region," Rafsanjani was further quoted by the daily.

Rafsanjani is currently in Syria at the invitation of President Bashar al-Assad. He arrived in Damascus on Wednesday.

Rafsanjani said Wednesday evening that the various Lebanese groups should not let differences of opinion change the country into a battlefield of sectarian conflicts.

At a meeting with Secretary-General of the Lebanese Hizbullah Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah at the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Rafsanjani said unity among the different Lebanese resistance groups was the key factor that secured their survival as well as continuation of the struggle against occupation.

On Tuesday, US State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack said Iran "is the central banker for terrorism in the Middle East. It's probably the most significant state sponsor of terrorism around the world. It is a supporter of Hizbullah. It is a supporter of Palestinian rejectionist groups."

Rafsanjani said Wednesday that the situation in Muslim countries including Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon have changed to the confusion of the US.
Meeting with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary-General Ramadan Shalah Rafsanjani said the "US has not succeeded in its hostile policies toward Islamic countries as evidenced by the defeat of their ominous plots through the continued defiance and struggle of Muslim states."

Praising the Palestinian resistance against the occupying Israelis, Rafsanjani said the people of Palestine were currently passing through a very "sensitive" period in their history which calls for all parties to unite in the common struggle to liberate Palestine from the yoke of its oppressors.

Iran's Nukes: Russia's Key

April 13, 2006
New York Post
Amir Taheri

link to original article

As the diplomatic maneuvers to pressure Iran to rein in its nuclear ambitions continue, the message one hears in policy circles in most capitals is simple: The key is in Moscow. Of all the powers involved in this showdown with the Islamic Republic, only Russia is in a position to tip the balance between a peaceful resolution or war.

Russia is building Iran's first and, so far, only nuclear power plant near Bushehr. It could slow or suspend the project pending a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. Such a move could strengthen the hands of those within the Tehran establishment that want a moratorium on uranium processing to prevent tension from further escalating.

And Russia has another card to play: It has proposed to set up a special-uranium enrichment project for Iran to cover the needs of the Bushehr plant for its full 37-year lifespan. (An agreement now in place has Russia providing the plant's fuel for its first 10 years.) To sweeten it for the Tehran leadership, the Russian proposal could be modified to have part of the enrichment process done in Iranian facilities and with the participation of Iranian scientists and technicians.

All that, however, may lead nowhere. Some analysts suspect that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may actually want a military conflict with the United States as the opening shot in his promised "Clash of Civilizations." He seems convinced that America, plagued by bitter internal dissension, lacks the stomach for a serious fight with the Islamic Republic and its radical allies throughout the Middle East. Thus he may want a clash over the nuclear issue, which many Iranians (thanks to the regime's Goebbelsian presentation) see as a matter of national pride.

But even then Russia could either prevent a clash or hasten it by vetoing or voting for a strong resolution in the U.N. Security Council. The Russian position there is crucial because China, which also has a veto, would not be prepared to isolate itself by siding with Iran if Russia sides with the United States. If Russia vetoes, so will China. If Russia doesn't veto, the most that China might do to please Iran is to abstain.

The Bush administration knows all this. That's why it's starting to build pressure on Russia ahead of this July's G-8 summit, which Russian President Vladimir Putin is to host. The American calculation is that Putin, having won the presidency of the G-8 for Russia for the first time, is unlikely to start his tenure by splitting the group to please the Iranian mullahs.

Yet Putin won't want to make an unambiguous choice between Tehran and Washington. Russia needs the Islamic Republic for a number of reasons - including as part of Moscow's strategy to counter U.S. influence in Central Asia, the Caspian basin and the Middle East.(Tehran and Moscow have been working closely in Afghanistan for more than a decade; they're now developing a joint strategy in anticipation of U.S. withdrawal once President Bush leaves office.)

Moscow also needs Tehran to prevent the United States from imposing its proposed model for the exploitation of the Caspian Sea's immense oil and gas resources.And, having lost all of its Soviet-era Arab friends and clients, Moscow also needs Tehran as a bridgehead to the Middle East, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The current analysis in Moscow is that, once Bush is gone, Iran will emerge as the dominant power in Iraq and would need Russia as a strategic partner in developing such major oilfields as Majnun which sit astride the Irano-Iraqi frontier.

The United States is not the only strategic rival that Russia has identified. Also looming large on the horizon is China which, Putin's recent visit to Beijing notwithstanding, many Moscow analysts see as a potential threat to Russian interests in Asia and the Middle East. A Sino-Iranian axis could isolate Russia in Western Asia and the Middle East and even shut it out of chunks of Central Asia.

Add to all that Russia's immense economic interest in the Islamic Republic. Iran is now the biggest market for Russian arms, including aircraft and submarines. The loss of the Iranian orders might force entire lines of Russian weapons industries to close down.

The two neighbors have also signed trade contracts worth $80 billion over the next decade. And Russia hopes to build most of the seven nuclear power plants that the Islamic Republic wants to set up in the next 10 years. More than 30,000 Russian technicians, both military and civilian, now work in Iran.

There is one more, and (according to Russian analysts) perhaps more important, factor: Putin can never be sure that, come the crunch, Washington will not strike a deal with Tehran, leaving Moscow in the lurch.

Iranian author Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.

In The Club

April 12, 2006
The Economist
Middle East & Africa

link to original article

Now that Iran has enriched uranium, can America talk to it about Iraq?

“I AM officially announcing that Iran has joined...those countries which have nuclear technology,” said Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's president, on April 11th. “This is the result of the Iranian nation's resistance.” By enriching a quantity of uranium at its pilot plant at Natanz, in defiance of pleas from the United Nations Security Council, Iran this week strengthened suspicions that it is trying to build a nuclear weapon and shifted its confrontation with America into a higher gear. Even if it has achieved only 3.5% enrichment as it claims—far short of the level required to power a bomb—it marks a significant technical breakthrough. It was a step, said both the Americans and the Russians, in the wrong direction.

Oddly enough, Iran's announcement came amid a flurry of speculation that America and Iran were talking to each other. Indeed, not since 2002, when domestic infighting scotched an Iranian effort to negotiate secretly with the United States, has Tehran been so abuzz with talk about talks. Few believe official claims that Muhammad Nahavandian's recent trip to Washington, DC, was “personal”. As a member of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of a country George Bush regards as a major threat to world peace, it may be wondered how Mr Nahavandian breezed through American immigration.

Other SNSC men are standing by to conduct talks, of a much more open nature, with American officials in Baghdad. These would be about ending sectarian violence in Iraq. But the officials may have to continue to stand by: the likelihood of such meetings happening, let alone achieving anything, is receding amid fiery speculation that America is planning military attacks on Iran if diplomacy fails to persuade it to stop its nuclear production.

Ali Larijani, the head of the SNSC, joined President Bush in pooh-poohing an article in the current New Yorker by Seymour Hersh, an investigative journalist, suggesting that America is considering the use of nuclear weapons to destroy Iran's underground nuclear facilities. Mr Larijani depicted such “psychological warfare” as evidence of America's “impotence” in the face of Iran's determination to produce nuclear fuel. Bold talk, but Iran's nervousness was revealed by its enthusiasm in taking up last month's request by Abdulaziz al-Hakim, an Iraqi Shia leader with good ties to his Iranian co-religionists, that it accept America's long-standing offer of talks aimed exclusively at trying to end the violence in Iraq. But the Americans themselves now seem cooler towards the idea of any talks—at least until the current, fractious efforts to form a government in Iraq have ended. A State Department official accused the Iranians of talking up negotiations only because “they find themselves under the scrutiny...of the international community concerning their nuclear activities.” Embarrassed, the Iranians are now backtracking, with the government insisting that it is in no hurry at all to talk.

Scant comfort, then, for those who long for an end to decades of American-Iranian enmity. The top American and Iranian envoys in Baghdad have already met “at least once”, says a well-connected Western diplomat. Rumour has it that a senior Iranian negotiator has also visited Iraq. But there is no sign that Mr Bush is receptive to overtures aimed at detente. The administration recently secured Congress's approval to give $75m to Iranian opposition groups.

Convinced that Mr Bush intends to try to topple them, Iran's leaders do not disguise their pleasure at America's Iraqi travails. The mayhem in Iraq, they believe, acts as a brake on Mr Bush's ambitions in Iran. But the Iranians are not as pervasive or as pernicious an influence in Iraq as the United States—and some Sunni Arab countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular—say they are. A recent report by the International Crisis Group argues that such reports are exaggerated.

To be sure, the Iranians flaunt the good relations that they have had for many years with Mr Hakim's Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and with the Dawa Party of the current embattled prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari. They also get on with Iraq's (Kurdish) president, Jalal Talabani. Equally, few doubt that Iran's spies are numerous, and its tradesmen and charity workers diligent.

But Iran remains mistrusted by many Iraqis, including many of the Shias who fought in large numbers against their Iranian co-religionists during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. It is doubtful, for instance, whether Iran, even if it wanted to, could put a stop to the anti-Sunni violence that is being perpetrated by SCIRI's associates. Nor does Mr Hakim, although he is a cleric and spent many years in exile in Iran, seek to replicate Iran's theocratic government. Privately, he is scathing about it.

All the same, a grey area surrounds the continuing failure of Iraq's main Sunni and Kurdish factions, backed in this instance by the United States, to persuade Mr Jaafari to stand down. Officials in Tehran disclaim Iranian involvement in government-building, but Hassan Kazemi Qomi, Iran's chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, confirms that Iran differs strongly from America about how much power Iraq's Shia groups should exercise.

Iran's support for Mr Jaafari has won it thanks of a sort from Muqtada al-Sadr, a prime-ministerial ally whose Mahdi Army has fought intermittently against the Americans. Iran finds the volatile cleric a useful squeeze on the influential (and Iranian-born) Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose influence over Shia communities around the world is a source of chagrin to Iran's clerical elite. In January, Mr Sadr elliptically threatened to retaliate against American interests if the United States attacked Iran. He is said to have received Iranian arms. But his animus towards Persians is known; there is no trust on either side.

Iran's vulnerable demography—it has big Sunni Arab and Kurd populations on its borders with Iraq—militates against too overt an involvement in sectarian violence. The Iranians blamed recent bomb blasts in the partly Arab province of Khuzestan on Arab separatists pushing a militant Sunni agenda. If, as the Americans believe, Iran has helped Sunni militants to get into Iraq, this may be as much to avoid entanglements as to provoke them.

The Iranians will not be reassured by Mr Hersh's assertion that America has special forces within Iran. They have fears, shared by the Turks, that the Americans are egging on the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan, an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers' Party whose separatist struggle in Turkey recently came bloodily back to life. Last month at least three members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard were killed, apparently by members of the group.

It is hard to see how Mr Bush can secure Iran's co-operation in Iraq, for what that is worth, without offering concessions. But Mr Bush will not be keen to conciliate a hostile state that seems only to be accelerating its quest for nuclear weapons.

Iran: Crossing the Redline?

April 12, 2006
Stratfor
stratfor.com

link to original article

Iranian officials are trumpeting a major advance in their country's nuclear program. Here is what it means -- and does not mean.

Analysis

Former Iranian President and Chairman of the Expediency Council Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani announced April 11 that Iran has successfully completed an enrichment cascade using 164 gas centrifuges, Kuwaiti state news agency KUNA announced. Such a cascade would empower Iran to produce a richer fissile blend of uranium for use in nuclear power plant fuel or perhaps a nuclear weapon.

Technically, the announcement means that Iran has established its ability to enrich uranium in something other than very small amounts. The Iranians are, however, not yet at the point that they can make weapons or fabricate nuclear fuel to run a reactor. A weapons program will require several of these cascades, and a power program requires dozens of them. Establishing enrichment cascades on that scale is still -- at bare minimum -- several months off. And even once that is achieved, enriched uranium would need to be fabricated into fuel for a reactor, or go through a weaponization process if it is to have military value. Neither process is simple, quick or cheap.

Politically, however, this step has immediate implications. In Europe, enrichment of any kind, much less on an industrial scale as the Iranians are clearly aiming for, is a redline. Once the Iranians move past enrichment, information on their nuclear weapons program can be garnered only through intensive intelligence efforts. Iran's announcement means that European states that see a limited reason to participate in such intelligence efforts no longer feel they have any leverage in negotiations. Europe will now simply put its relatively disinterested diplomatic efforts behind the United States and let Washington run the show. It is not carte blanche -- the Europeans still do not want military action -- but it is close.

For Israel, the issue is more complex. As noted above, enrichment does not automatically equate to weaponization. Israel, unlike Europe, has a deep and abiding interest in directing intelligence efforts against Tehran. Thus, Israel's picture of the Iranian nuclear program is more complete than Europe's. As one would expect, this deeper awareness and interest translates into a different redline, likely somewhere in the weaponization process. The world can be certain that Iran has not yet stepped over Israel's redline; after all, Tehran is still a city, not a crater.

But ultimately the Iranian announcement is about the United States. Iran and Washington are currently -- for the first time in a generation -- engaged in direct talks, officially about all topics Iraqi. This revelation, like the U.S. leaks over the weekend that nuclear strike options against Iran had been drawn up, are all part of the ebb and flow of those negotiations.

Iran is Racing Down Nuclear Route Before UN Can Put Up Roadblock

April 13, 2006
The Times
Bronwen Maddox

link to original article

Iran's sudden announcement this week that it has begun enriching uranium presents the world with two riddles. First, is Iran now set on having a nuclear weapon? It says not. But the most plausible interpretation of its behaviour is that it wants to put itself within easy reach of one.

Secondly, can diplomatic pressure persuade it to drop those ambitions? A plausible answer is that the United Nations might eventually persuade it to freeze its work — but almost certainly not to scrap what it has achieved.

On that view, the best interpretation of this week’s events is that Iran is pressing ahead as fast as it can so that, if it does ever strike a deal, it surrenders as little ground as possible.

Yesterday the countries that have most energetically tried to persuade Iran to leave the nuclear road joined together to condemn its action.

It was important for the hopes of any diplomatic pressure that Russia and China, both permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, added their voices to that declaration.

The United States, Britain and France, the other permanent members, have been vigorous in wanting to ratchet up pressure on Tehran, but Russia and China have held back. Iran has gone to great lengths to sign intricate and lucrative energy deals with Russia and China, and they stand to lose most if the UN moves towards sanctions.

Russia pointedly added yesterday that it believed that force could not resolve the dispute. Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign Minister, said that military plans “could create a dangerous explosive blaze in the Middle East, where there are already enough blazes”.

Wang Guangya, China’s UN Ambassador, said “to talk about military and other sanctions will not be helpful”.

Weekend reports in the US suggested that the Bush Administration was keeping the option of military action open, at least in theory, even though President Bush dismissed the talk as “wild speculation”.

Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, said yesterday that the Security Council, which has told Tehran to halt all enrichment work by April 28, would need to “take strong steps to make certain (to) maintain the credibility of the international community”.

“When the Security Council reconvenes this month,” Ms Rice said: “I think it will be time for action. We can’t let this continue.”

Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN watchdog, will arrive in Tehran today to seek full co-operation with the Security Council and IAEA.

Many analysts have argued that the provocative timing of the move, in the middle of the 30-day period set by the council for freezing the work, is an attempt to secure Iran’s position, and present a fait accompli.

Iran is likely to argue that it cannot be expected to give up all of a programme showing steady technical progress. “They clearly have no intention of stopping”, Gary Samore, proliferation expert at the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago, said.

Mark Fitzpatrick, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, argued that “negotiating with a country to roll back” a programme was rarely successful — witness the success of North Korea in holding on to its work in the face of intense international pressure.

European officials believe that the best chance for diplomacy may be to force Iran into the position of rejecting an offer that all members of the Security Council regard as self- evidently reasonable.

One version of this has been mooted by British officials — that the five permanent members of the council, plus Germany, offer a return to talks provided that Iran freezes its enrichment and submits to all IAEA inspections.

Iran’s move this week appears designed to make even that attempt look out of date.

 

 

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